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ABSTRACT 
This study will provide a framework for understanding the concept of 
martyrdom in Islam and the development of the 'suicide bomber' as a form 
of martyrdom. I will argue that 'suicide bombing' as a form ofmartyrdom is 
not a simple development of traditional jurisprudential concepts of 
martyrdom or jihad, for either the Shi'a or the Sunni tradition. Its 
introduction as a form of martyrdom is due to the reinterpretation ofShi'a 
revivalist martyrdom ideologies into Sunni revivalist jihad ideologies. It is 
'suicide bombings" martyrological origin within a Shi' a concept of 'political 
martyrdom' that is responsible for the transformative nature of 'suicide 
bombing' use as a tactic. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1:1 INTRODUCTION 
'Suicide bombing' as a phenomenon is not exclusive to any religion; 1 it does not 
necessarily need to be connected with religion at all.2 However, religion does play a 
proportionally significant role. Over 70 percent of all 'suicide bombings' from 2000-
2003 were motivated by religion.3 While 'suicide bombing' is in no way restricted to 
the religion oflslam, 4 it is specifically relevant: approximately half of the 'suicide 
bombing' attacks that have occurred from 1983-2003 have an association with Islam. 5 
Islamic groups that use 'suicide bombing' use religious rhetoric to support the 
motivation and legitimacy of the use of the tactic.6 All Islamic groups that use 'suicide 
bombing' claim that the 'suicide bombers' are martyrs for Islam. 7 The role of the 
'suicide bomber' as a martyr is consistently used to provide religious legitimization for 
the use of 'suicide bombings' as a tactic. In light of this, it is crucial that 'suicide 
bombing ' associated with Islam is understood in terms of the concept of martyrdom in 
1 Although I do not technically agree with the accuracy of the term 'suicide bombing', I have chosen to use it because there 
is an accepted understanding of what it entai ls. 'Suicide bombing' can be concisely defined as: 'a politically or 
religiously motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely 
causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator's ensured death is a 
precondition for the success ofhjs mission' . (Yoram Schweitzer, "Suicide Bombing: Development and Characteristics". 
Institute for Counter Terrorism , http: //www.ict.org.il , accessed: August 18th 2006). Note: for the purpose of this study 
the term 'suicide bombing' generally refers to all types of'suicide attacks', such as when a vehicle is used instead of a 
bomb. 
2 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: Th e Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. (New York: Random House, 2005), p.4 . 
3 Scott Atran,"Mishandling Suicide Terrorism", The Washington Quarterly 7:3 (Summer 2004), p.69. 
4 On a group-by-group comparison, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka hold the record for the most prolific use of the tactic of 
'suicide bombing'. Robert Pape, op cit, p. 4 . 
5 Ibid, p.l7. 
Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation found that 80 percent of the 'suicide bombings' since 1968 have occurred post-
9/11; of those, 31 out of the 35 groups responsible for the attacks are associated with Islam. Bruce Hoffman, "Security 
for the New Century", Washington D.C., September 23 ,2005. Accessed in, Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth 
ofS uicide Terrorism", The Washington Quarterly 29:2 (Spring 2006), p.l27. 
Note: " Islamic groups" refers to groups who consider themselves to be associated with Islam and who use 'suicide 
bombing ' as a form of martyrdom. 
6 The use of Islamic rhetoric to claim the legitimacy of'suicide bombing ' is highly controversial and the rhetoric used is in 
no way universal to Islam, or even accepted by a significant proportion ofMuslims. This study is an examination of the 
development of the Islamic concepts apparent in 'suicide bombing ' , not a judgment on the legitimization of these 
concepts. 
7 The use of the word 'suicide bomber ' etc. from this point onwards is with reference to specifically Islamic 'suicide 
bombing' , unless otherwise specified. 
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Islam. This study will provide a framework for understanding martyrdom in Islam and 
will examine the development of the concept of martyrdom that lead to the emergence 
of the 'suicide bomber' martyr. It will demonstrate that, contrary to assertions in most 
studies on 'suicide bombing' , the developments within the concept of martyrdom play a 
significant role in the introduction of'suicide bombing ' associated with Islam and 
continues to influence the developments of ' suicide bombings' as a tactic. 
By examining the development ofthe concept of martyrdom from early Islam, this study 
will illustrate that Islam has a diverse martyrological tradition. The concept of 
martyrdom is not static, and understood very differently across jurisprudential traditions, 
particularly in concern to the relationship of martyrdom withjihad. Essentially, this will 
demonstrate that ' suicide bombing ' as a form of martyrdom is not a simple development 
of traditional jurisprudential concepts of either martyrdom or jihad, in either the Shi'a or 
Sunni tradition. The development of the 'suicide bomber' as a form of martyrdom is due 
to an amalgamation of Shi 'a revivalist martyrdom ideologies into Sunni revivalist jihad 
ideologies. 8 It is 'suicide bombings'' martyrological origin within Shi ' a revivalist 
martyrdom ideologies that is responsible for the transformative nature of'suicide 
bombing' as a tactic, as there is a constant need to renegotiate its symbolic value. It will 
become clear that the driving force behind the Islamic 'suicide bombing ' phenomenon is 
Shi 'ite scholar Ali Shari'ati's philosophy; 'Ifyou can, kill, and ifyou cannot, die'. 
This study seeks to provide a new understanding of the Islamic concept of 'suicide 
bombing ' and to rectify the misconception in the current literature on the subject, as 
outlined below. 
8 I use the term Revivalist in a very board sense, to mean movements who seek a renewa l of Is lam, through a 
reinterpretation of a h istorica l idea l into the contemporary situation. 
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1:2 LITERARY REVIEW 
'Suicide bombing' as a concept is a relatively new area of study, therefore, the quantity 
and quality of related research is limited. The 'popular' literature as a whole tends to be 
journalistic and sensationalist in nature, generally consisting of a series of case studies 
focusing on the life of individual 'suicide bombers'. Each narrative tends to highlight that 
which is foreign to the typical Western audience, making generalizations and feeding 
common Orientalist stereotypes. However, there seems to be increasingly more valuable 
'academic' studies being produced on this subject. They come under a number of 
different schools of study, from strategic studies to psychology. Nevertheless the 
'academic' literature on this subject, irrespective of approach, displays a series ofkey 
misconceptions when referring to Islamic 'suicide bombing', which results in an analysis 
oflslamic 'suicide bombing' which is out of context from its development. These 
misconceptions significantly limit the ability to provide an adequate understanding of 
Islamic 'suicide bombing'. 
There are four problematic areas in the current literature that contribute to the 
misunderstanding ofislamic 'suicide bombing';9 there is no distinction made between the 
different jurisprudential traditions within Islam and their understanding of the concepts of 
martyrdom and jihad; the notion ofjihad is given disproportionate and misleading 
significance in the development of'suicide bombing'; the concept of martyrdom (and 
occasionally jihad) is considered to be static; and finally, martyrdom is considered to be 
exclusively a subsidiary concept within the notion of jihad. These problematic areas 
represent a crucial gap in this area of study, and are the result ofthe lack of in-depth 
9 Needless to say, not all of the literature makes all four of these misconceptions s imultaneously. 
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study focusing on the development of the concept of martyrdom in Islam directly in 
relation to the development of the 'suicide bomber' as a form of martyrdom. 
An analysis of the development of the concept of martyrdom is crucial to being able to 
understand the foundations ofthe phenomenon oflslamic 'suicide bombing' , as 
martyrdom is the central jurisprudential concept behind 'suicide bombing' and its ' 
continuing development as a tactic. The concept of martyrdom is used by Islamic groups 
for legitimization, justification, glorification and propaganda. Furthermore, it is the 
construction ofthe concept of martyrdom that is one of the key issues for those who do 
not support the use of'suicide bombing ' and it forms the basis on which they condemn 
the action. 10 Islamic 'suicide bombing ' cannot be separated from the concept of 
martyrdom and cannot be understood successfully when removed from that context. It is 
by highlighting the importance of the concept of martyrdom in the development of 
Islamic 'suicide bombing' that I hope to rectify the misconceptions within the current 
studies in this field. 
Although current studies that refer to Islamic ' suicide bombing' universally acknowledge 
that 'suicide bombers' are understood as martyrs by those who support them and 
generally provide some analysis of the concept, they fail to place 'suicide bombing' 
within the context of the development ofthe concept of martyrdom in Islam. Instead 
there is a focus on the notion ofjihad, placing martyrdom exclusively as a subsidiary of 
jihad, and thus understand 'suicide bombing ' not as a development within the concept of 
martyrdom, but as a development purely within the notion ofjihad. While jihad is crucial 
to the understanding and the development of 'suicide bombing ', the importance attributed 
10The basic argument aga inst 'suic ide bombing' as a form of martyrdom is that actively and intentionally causing one's own 
death is eq ui valent to suicide, regardless of the situat ion. Thi s martyrdom/suic ide issue will be explored in more depth in 
the follow ing chapter. 
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to it is disproportional in relation to the importance given to the concept of martyrdom. 
As this study will attempt to show, the model of martyrdom that provided the ideological 
basis for the development of 'suicide bombing' is not at all a subsidiary of the notion of 
jihad. 
To assess the development of the concept of martyrdom in Islam, it is necessary to 
examine first the early jurisprudential and historical construction of the concept. This is a 
significantly outdated and neglected area of study, with one of the better studies, A.J. 
Wensinck, The Oriental Doctrine of the Martyrs, dating back to 1921. 11 The modem 
studies on 'suicide bombing' that make reference to earlier jurisprudential and historical 
constructions of martyrdom keep the discussion brief and they do not afford the subject 
any critical or in-depth analysis. This results in the failure to make a distinction between 
the understanding of martyrdom andjihad across different jurisprudential traditions. The 
differing jurisprudential traditions' constructions of martyrdom and jihad are an essential 
aspect ofthe development of the Islamic 'suicide bomber' . The introduction of 'suicide 
bombing' occurred as the result of an amalgamation of a revivalist Shi'a ideological 
understanding of martyrdom and a revivalist Sunni ideological understanding ofjihad. 
1:3 METHODOLOGY 
1 :3:1 Method of Study for Islam and the Categorization of Martyrdom 
In an attempt to provide an examination oflslamic 'suicide bombing' within a context of 
the development of the concept of martyrdom, I have, during the course of this study, 
devised a framework for the categorization of martyrdom in Islam. This framework will 
11 Although it is fairly 'Orientalist' in nature. The most va luable study on early constructions of the concept of 
martyrdom in Islam is, Etan Kohlberg, Medieval Views on Martyrdom. (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1997). 
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provide the primary stmcture for my analysis on the developments within the concept of 
martyrdom. 
Figure 1: Types of Martyrdom in Islam 
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P ASSNE: refers to martyrdom in which the martyr has no predetermination over his death and does not 
have any intention of dying. 
-'PASSNE COMBATNE' : Non-intentional death in the context of military jihad (conventional 
battlefield death) 
- 'P ASSNE NON-COMBA TNE': Non-intentional death that is not within the context of military 
jihad . 
-'Passive Non-Combative Accidental': Accidental death (e .g., death during childbirth, 
crushed by falling building, eaten by a lion) . 
-' Passive Non-Combative Non-Accidental': Death at the hands of someone else (homicide, 
execution). 
-'Passive Non-Combative Duty': Death is not required, title of martyr earned via duty 
(Qur 'an reciter). 
- 'P ASSNE POLITICAL' : Non-intentional death within a political context or for a political cause 
(execution). 
ACTIVE: refers to martyrdom in which the martyr has an intention or a predetermination of dying; it can 
include any situation in which the martyr has any influence over his death. 
-'ACTNE COMBATNE': Intentional death within the context ofrrulitary jihad (early Islamic 
martyrdom). 
-'ACTIVE POLITICAL': Intentional death within a political context or for a political cause 
(Iranian revolutiona~y martyrs) . 
-'Active Politico-Combative': Active political martyrdom with combative means (Suicide 
bomber mwtyrs) 
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-'ACTIVE NON-COMBATIVE: Intentional death not within the context of military jihad and not 
for a military cause (Murder or execution of steadfast scholars and p rotestors). 
This categorization of the types of martyrdom provides a structure that allows for the 
key ideological developments in this concept to be clearly identified. The primary 
distinction for martyrdom in Islam is between 'passive ' and ' active' martyrdom. This 
distinction is essential in understanding the developments in the concept. 12 Furthermore, 
the 'passive' and 'active ' distinction illustrates the key conceptual difference between 
Sunni and Shi ' a traditional understandings ofmartyrdom. An examination ofthe 
concept of martyrdom in terms ofthis distinction highlights the significance ofthe 
appropriation of 'suicide bombing ' by Sunni groups, as Sunni jurisprudence traditionally 
prohibits ' active' martyrdom. The lesser categories of martyrdom will be examined in-
depth within the second chapter, as Islam 's rich martyrological tradition is explored. 
1:3:2 Method of Study for the Contemporary Development of Martyrdom 
The Islamic notion ofthe ' suicide bomber' arose due to a series of reinterpretations of 
historical and fundamental Islamic ideologies on martyrdom and jihad, as a response to 
political situations. It is the religious scholars that play the principal role in creating these 
ideological shifts. It is through an analysis of primary scholarly text and secondary source 
commentary, in conjunction with an assessment of the political situations the scholars 
were responding to , that I hope to provide a clear illustration of the developments that 
have occurred within the concept of martyrdom in Islam during the 20th century. 
While there is a diverse range oflslamic scholarship on the subjects of martyrdom and 
12 Note: While 'Active' and ' Passive' are mutua ll y exc lusive catego1ies, the exact division between the two is blurred: 
categorisation depends on the jurisprudential position. This distinction is alluded to within studies on 'suicide bombing', 
but has never been categorized systematica ll y. 
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jihad, my study will be qualitative rather than quantitative. In the third chapter I have 
sought to examine the most influential scholars responsible for the ideological changes 
on the central concepts of martyrdom and jihad. For my analysis on martyrdom, I have 
concentrated my research on the Shi'ite religious scholarship coming out of Iran and 
Iraq during the 1960's and 1970's. I have focused specifically on the works ofKhomeini 
and Shari'ati, who I have identified as the key political and intellectual figures, 
respectively, in the development of the concept of martyrdom. For my analysis onjihad 
I have concentrated my research on three key scholars in the revivalist Sunni movement; 
Mawdudi, Al-Banna, and Qutb. These three scholars were highly influential on 
'popular' Islamist thought onjihad. Through a comparative analysis ofthe Shi'ite 
scholars' work on martyrdom and the Sunni revivalist scholars' work onjihad, I have 
identified complementary ideological features that have allowed for the possibility of the 
'suicide bomber' martyr. The fourth chapter is essentially an examination of the 
application of these complementary ideologies in the emergence and consequent spread 
of the idea of the Islamic 'suicide bomber'. An analysis ofFadhlullah's speeches is used 
to illustrate how the complementary ideologies of the revivalist Shi'a concept on 
martyrdom and the revivalist Sunni notion of jihad transformed into the 'suicide 
bomber' and created the conditions that allowed for the conceptual leap across to Sunni 
groups in Palestine. 13 Finally an examination of current adaptations occurring in the use 
of 'suicide bombings' as a tactic will be examined in relation to its martyrological 
origins, demonstrating that the transformative nature ofthe phenomenon is an attempt to 
renegotiate its symbolic value. 
13 I have been restricted in my ability to utilize primary texts because of my very limited knowledge of Arabic and Persian: 
I have for the most part had to rely on translations and secondary commentary. Although this is not ideal, reading a 
variety of translations and commentaries has given me a good understanding of the different ways in which some of the 
scholars have been understood and at points misinterpreted altogether. 
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1:4 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter Two: 'Early Islamic Martyrdom' will provide the historical background of the 
concept of martyrdom in Islam and construct an understanding for the framework of the 
different types of martyrdom in Islamic jurisprudence. This chapter will essentially show 
that the understanding ofthe concept of martyrdom is not homogeneous in Islamic 
thought; furthermore, the distinctions between the different understandings of 
martyrdom primarily arises as a result of internal splits within the Islamic community 
and the subsequent development of different jurisprudential traditions. 
The early dissenting groups who opposed the Sunni ruling authority tended to place 
significant emphasis on martyrdom, specifically 'active martyrdom' . The Shi'ites, as a 
dissenting group, placed great importance on the concept of martyrdom. The historical 
event of the Imam Hussein's martyrdom at the hands of the Sunni caliph Y azid, is 
central to Shi'a identity and provides the basis for their understanding of martyrdom. 
Their historical position as a persecuted minority has resulted in the development of an 
extensive tradition of martyrdom and allowed for the preservation of the legitimacy of 
'active martyrdom'. As a response to dissenting groups' emphasis on 'active 
martyrdom', Sunnijurisprudence rejected the idea of'active martyrdom': prohibition of 
'active martyrdom' reflected an attempt by Sunni jurists to create a jurisprudential 
disassociation from dissenting groups. The Sunni historical position as the central 
authority has resulted in the development within the Sunni tradition of a quietist 
'passive' tradition of martyrdom. 
Chapter Three: 'Contemporary Islamic Scholarship and the Revival of Martyrdom' will 
provide a comparative analysis of influential contemporary revivalist scholarship on 
12 
martyrdom and jihad. This chapter will examine the ideological shifts within the 
revivalist Shi'a concept of martyrdom and the revivalist Sunni notion ofjihad. 
Demonstrating that although the 'suicide bomber' is not a simple development out of 
either revivalist movement, there are parallel ideologies that would allowed for the 
emergence of' suicide bombing'. 
The analysis will show that it is the Iranian Revolutionary understanding of martyrdom, 
'active political martyrdom', that provides the primary ideological basis for the 'suicide 
bomber'. The 'active political martyrdom' is the result ofShari'ati's reinterpretation of 
the narrative ofHussein as an act of martyrdom divorced fromjihad. Divorcing 
Hussein's martyrdom from the restrictions of the Shi'a conditions ofjihad allowed for 
the transformation of Hussein as an example of revolutionary spirit into an imitable 
model for revolutionary martyrdom. Khomeini utilized Shari'ati's ideas on Hussein to 
create the 'active political martyr' of the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq war, the 
martyr who chooses to give up his life and die as a symbolic tool to condemn the 
'oppressor'. 
Sunni revivalist notions ofjihad, specifically that ofQutb, show several similar 
ideological shifts to those that were crucial in the Shi'a development ofthe 'active 
political martyr'. The similar ideologies can be seen in the role of the individual and the 
construction of the enemy as the 'oppressor'. This chapter will argue that it is these 
parallel ideologies that provided a complementary basis that could allow for the 
amalgamation of the revivalist Shi'a concept of martyrdom and the revivalist Sunni of 
jihad. This amalgamation would essentially allow for the introduction ofthe 'suicide 
bombing' as a form of martyrdom, as it would theoretically give the Shi'ite martyr who 
could actively choose to die, the ability of the Sunnijihadi, who could legitimately 
13 
choose to kill. 
Chapter Four: 'The Islamic 'Suicide Bomber'' , will examine the practical application of 
the Shi ' a 'active political martyr' into the revivalist notion ofjihad, with the emergence 
of the 'suicide bomber' martyr in Lebanon in 1983, by the Shi' a group Hezbollah. 14 An 
examination of the pronouncement by Fadlullah, the spiritual guide ofHezbollah, on 
'suicide bombing' , shows how the reinte1pretation of the 'active political martyr' into a 
revivalist notion ofjihad, allowed for Shari ' ati ' s philosophy of 'If you can, kill, and if 
you cannot, die!' to be understood as justification for a martyr to choose to die while 
killing. The 'suicide bomber' became a successful jihad tactic for the militarily weak 
against the 'oppressive ' enemy. The reinteipretation of the ' active political martyr' into 
jihad removed the Shi'a-centric model of Hussein, shifting the legitimacy onto the 
condition ofjihad. This made the 'suicide bombing ' form of martyrdom more available 
for appropriation by Sunni groups in Palestine. Finally, this chapter will illustrate that 
one of the recent tactical developments within the Sunni use of 'suicide bombing' as a 
tool of ' terrorism ', the introduction of the female ' suicide bomber', is the result of its 
origins as Shi ' a ' active political martyrdom'. 
The emergence of the Islamic 'suicide bomber' is primarily a result of developments 
within the concept of martyrdom in Islam - a process that this study will now attempt to 
unfold. 
14 Because of the Shi 'a focus on my research, I fo llow Irani an scholars in transliterating Arabic and Persian wo rds to 
Engli sh, i.e. short ( i) is transliterated as (e) rather the common method (i). 
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CHAPTER TWO: EARLY ISLAM MARTYRDOM 
2:1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is essentially an attempt to provide a context and understanding of 
martyrdom in Islam. By examining the early construction of martyrdom and the 
developments that occurred in the concept due to changes in the early political 
situation, this chapter will show that the understanding of martyrdom in Islam is not 
static. The categorization ofthe different types of martyrdom explored in this chapter 
can provide a framework for understanding martyrdom in Islam. 15 
An examination of the Qur'an and Hadith literature 16 clearly illustrates that the early 
understanding of who and what made the first Islamic martyrs is defined within the 
context of war against non-Muslims. The sources surrounding the early Islamic 
military battles suggest that the original ideal martyr was one who zealously waged 
war against the unbeliever and fought to the death. 17 Within the Prophet 
Muhammad's lifetime, the understanding ofmartyrdom began to develop, 18 allowing 
for one to zealously engage in battle but wish to come out alive, they did not need to 
seek certain death. After the death of Muhammad , divisions within the foundational 
Muslim community arose due to the issue of succession. These divisions and the 
changing political situation of the post-conquest era ultimately resulted in a radical 
15 See: Figure I , p. 9 
16 Recorded sayings and actions of Muhammad, based on the authority of a chain of reliable transmitters. 
17 Based on the Qur'an and the attributed Hadith. 
All Qur'anic quotations and references from a translation by Yusaf Ali , available at 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/searchquran .html (cited: 18th August 2006) 
All Hadith references in this study (Sahih Bukhari , Sahih Muslim, Sunan Abu Dawud, Malik's Muwatta), are available at 
http://www .usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/searchhad ith .h tm I (cited: 18th August 2006) 
Unless the information was gathered from a secondary source, and they have not provided the specific reference to a Hadith. 
18Approximately 59 years after h.is bitth . 
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transformation in the understanding of martyrdom, to a concept that went well 
beyond its original meaning. 
The Shi' a sect, who formed over the issue of succession of Muhammad, holds the 
event of Imam Hussein 's martyrdom at the hands ofthe ruling Sunni caliph Yazid as 
central to their identity. Their historical position as a minority dissenting group under 
a central Sunni authority allowed for preservation of an 'active' approach to 
martyrdom. The Sunni tradition as the ruling authority rejected the 'active' and the 
'combative' form of martyrdom in order to create political distance from dissenting 
groups and to make the rewards of martyrdom more available in the political stable 
post-conquest era. Thus, from a very early stage in Islamic history the concept of 
martyrdom had many different constructions. The understanding of the concept of 
martyrdom differs greatly across jurisprudential traditions. 
2:2 THE ORIGINS OF THE SHAHID 
When examining the Qur'an for references to martyrdom, there is a problem of 
terminology. The Arabic noun for martyr is shahid (plural shuhada), which literally 
translates to mean 'witness', a terminology that is identical to that of the Christian 
concept of martyr. The application of the word shahid to mean martyr in Islam, one 
who witnesses for his faith by the sacrifice of his life, generates some controversy 
over its origin. Historical evidence suggests that shahid 's meaning as martyr is not 
because of a connection between witnessing and death in Islamic thought; rather, it is 
a post-Qur' anic construction and is derived from the Syriac Christian notion of the 
concept. 19 The term shahid, however, does appear frequently in the Qur'an, although 
19 Ignaz Goldz iher, Muslim Studies Volume Two, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971 ), p.350 . 
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it is not used in relation to martyrdom. The term appears to be used in its literal sense, 
describing 'one who witnesses an event',20 in either the legal sense or in the ordinary 
sense of 'eyewitness' ?1 The term is used to describe both God as a 'witness' and 
human beings as 'witnesses' to a variety of events and ideas.22 In addition, there are 
some verses in the Qur'an where the title Al-Shahid is used as a divine name for God, 
since in Islam God is understood to be 'witness' to all things and possessor of all 
knowledge.23 
The actual Qur'anic verses that are clearly on the concept 'martyrdom' are sparse. 
The verses do not appear to convey a unified concept of martyrdom, in the technical 
or linguistic sense, and are not conveyed through the same Arabic root as shahid, but 
in phrases such as "those slain in the path of Allah" (Q.2:154, 3:169).24 The Qur'anic 
verses that display a notion of martyrdom appear to be in reference to deaths that 
occur in the struggle for the cause of God in general. Thus, struggle,jihad, provides 
the initial context for martyrdom in Islam. Accounts of the earliest Muslim martyrs 
reflect this context.25 
For a detailed argument on the adoption of this word from the Syriac Christian concept, see Keith Lewinstein article in, 
Margaret Cormack ( ed.), Sacrificing the Self, (New York: Ox ford University Press, 2001) 
20 Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal Hi story," Fordham International 
Law Journa/27 (December 2003): p. 317 
21 
"Martyrdom" Islam and the Muslim World," http: //www.gale.com/pdf/samples/sp656032.pdf, (cited: October 14th 2005) 
22 It is important to note that the ideas of witnessing, witness etc, are centra l to Islamic thought and to being a Muslim. The 
most important assertion of the concept of'witness' is the ftrst pillar oflslam, that a Muslim bares witness to the theological 
fact that God is the one God and Muhammad is his messenger. 
23 Bernard K. Freamon, (December 2003), p.318 
24 Margaret Cormack (ed.), Sacrificing the Self, (New York: Oxford University Press,200 1 ), p. 79 
It seems that later Qur'an ic commentary has sought to read 'martyr' in some areas where the root sh-h-d appears and the 
phrasing or context is ambiguous, most notably Q 3:140, 4:69, 3:170 and 57:19 where shuhada, 'witnesses' appears to 
describe people who are rewarded for being 'truthful' and 'steadfast' for the cause of God. A 'steadfastness' where 
'sacrifice of life' might reasonably be included . By wide consensus, in contemporary Qur'anic commentary 'witnesses' 
is now read as ' martyr ' i.n many of these verses. Bernard K. Freamon, (December 2003 ), p. 318 
25
"Martyrdom", Islam and the Muslim World, http://www.gale.com/pdf/samples/sp656032.pdf, (cited: October 14th 2005) 
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2:2:1 Early Martyrdom and the Qur'an 
According to the Qur'an and Hadith literature, there are two types ofjihad. The 
'greater jihad', jihad al-akbar, and the 'lesser jihad', jihad al-asgar. The greater jihad 
consists of an individual's constant and internal struggle with the earthly and immoral 
aspects ofthe individual sel£ The lesser jihad is external and involves the concept of 
military or combative struggle, inter alia, a collective struggle by Muslims in order to 
protect and defend Islam and/or the Muslim community. According to Hadith 
literature, the Prophet Muhammad said that the greater jihad or the internal jihad is 
more important than its external military or combative counterpart.26 The greater 
jihad places emphasis on justice, rectitude, fidelity, integrity, and truth. These aspects 
of the greater jihad set the foundations for the understanding of the concept of jihad 
in Islamic jurisprudence and law, and for the construction of meaning for the lesser 
jihad.27 The lesser jihad is the primary context for early Islamic martyrdom?8 
The early Islamic concept of martyrdom is one of the key features that stem out of 
military aspect of the lesser jihad. Military jihad is authorized in the Qur'an and the 
following verses are the genesis of the concept of military jihad in Islamic theology: 
26 The expressions "greater jihad'' and "lesser jihad'' appeared in various non-canonical compilations ofHadith such as the 
sunan of Ahmad ibn AI-Husein Al-Bayhaqi (d. 1 066). According to the hadith, the Prophet said to those returning from 
the battles: "You came from the best place, from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad." They said: "What is the greater 
jihad?" He said: "When man overcomes his urges." "Special Dispatch Series No. 972", The Middle East Media 
Research Institute, , http://mernri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP97205 (cited: September I st 
2006). 
27 Bernard k. Freamon, p.301. 
28 There are two different types of lesser jihad, offensive and defensive. Defensive jihad's meaning is relatively universal; it 
is the obligation to protect Muslims and the 'land oflslam' . However, offensive jihad is understood differently in Sunni 
and Shi'a jurisprudential traditions . Offensive jihad has more prominent in Sunni jurisprudence due to their position as 
the central authority in the caliphate. Although offensive jihad's importance has diminished in the last few centuries; 
however, its' traditional understanding by Sunni jurisprudence was as an obligation to make war against polytheists and 
the means by which to expand their caliphate and the rule ofGod?8 For Shi'a theology the ability Shi'ites to engage in 
offensive jihad disappeared with the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in 874, as offensive jihad only be legitimately 
declared by an Imam. As a result offensive jihad, for the expansion of territory, spread oflslam or any construction of 
jihad that is not purely defensive, cannot be legitimately be declared until his return. (This is a Twelver Shi 'a 
understanding of the different types of jihad.) This is different understanding of the conditions of jihad for the Sunni and 
Shi'a traditions is often overlooked, however it is a distinction that is particularily important in the contemporary 
development of the 'suicide bomber' martyr. 
Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Taba Tabaie, Shi 'a in Islam, Qom: The Office oflslamic Publications, 1990), p.65-77 
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"To those against whom war is made, pe1mission is given [to fight} , 
because they are wronged- and verily, Allah is Most Powerful in their 
aid- [They are] those who have been expelled from their homes in 
defiance of right - [for no cause} except that they say, 'Our Lord is 
Allah. "-Yusuf Ali Q 22:39-40 
The Qur'anic verses on military jihad state that when there is war, there will 
sometimes be the need for the loss oflife of community members. It is from this 
notion that the first concept of martyrdom in Islam is constructed, 'combative 
martyrdom', those who die in a battle. 
The introduction ofthe concept of martyrdom in Islam stems from the early military 
encounters of Muhammad and his followers with non-Mulsim Arabs. It is from the 
traditions based on these encounters and the Qur'anic revelations accredited to them 
that we can construct an understanding of how the early Muslims first understood 
Islamic martyrdom and how they perceived the notion: 
"Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead. Nay, they 
live, finding their sustenance in th e presence of their Lord; They rejoice 
in the bounty provided by Allah: And with regard to those left behind, 
who have not yet joined them (in their bliss), the (Martyrs) glory in the 
fact that on them is no fear, nor have they (cause to) grieve. "- Yusuf 
Ali Q 3:169-70 
The above Qur'anic verses refer to those who are killed while fighting for God. The 
Hadith traditions based on these verses suggest that this is probably the earliest 
establishment of martyrdom in Islam. The tradition based around the above verses 
follows that Muhammad received the revelation in 625, on the occasion of one of the 
earliest battles, the battle ofUhud, between Muhammad and his followers29 and 
polytheist Arab tribes. According to the tradition, when the Muslims warriors were 
killed, their spirits rose to Paradise, and when they discovered the wonders of 
Paradise they wished they could return to the living world to inform their brothers of 
29 All dates are C.E. 
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it, so that their brothers would not be scared and would surge forward in battle for 
God. God agreed to do this on their behalf, thus the verse was revealed to 
Muhammad.30 
Like the above verse, all other Qur'anic verses that are clearly concerned with 
martyrdom are with reference to a war, or they specifically refer to military jihad. The 
above verse and those similar indicate that those killed while fighting for God will be 
rewarded. However, the emphasis in the Qur'anic verses regarding this reward is not 
purely isolated to just those who were slain, it also includes all those who fight 'in the 
way of God' . Those who fight 'in the way ofGod' are awarded special status beyond 
the promise of Paradise, they have the 'highest rank in the sight of Allah '31 , their sins 
would be forgiven and, whether they are slain or victorious, they receive 'reward of 
great value' .32 The one reward purely designated for martyrs is the promise of 
immediate life in Paradise,33 beyond that the Qur'an is not overly concerned with 
martyrs as a separate group apart from the non-martyred Muslims.34 It is in the Hadith 
literature that the subject of martyrdom becomes elevated and martyrs become clearly 
distinguished from non-martyred Muslims. 
30 Etan Kohl berg, Medieval Views on Martyrdom, (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 
1997), p . 6 
31 Those who believe, and suffer exile and strive with might and main, in Allah's cause, with their goods and their persons, 
have the highest rank in the sight of Allah: they are the people who will achieve (salvation). -Yusuf Ali Q9:20 
32Let those fight in th e cause of Allah Who sell the life of this world for the hereafter. To him who jighteth in the cause of 
Allah,- whether he is slain or gets victory- Soon shall We give him a reward of great (value). -Yusuf Ali Q4 :74 
33 Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead. Nay, th ey live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their 
Lord;-Yusuf ALi Q3 :169 
The contemporary understanding of the rewards are martyrdom are; "From the moment the first drop of blood is spilled, the 
martyr does not feel the pains of his injury, and is resolved of all his bad deeds; he sees his seat in Paradise; he is saved 
from the torture of the grave; he is saved from the fear of the Day of Judgment; he marries seventy-two beautiful black-
eyed women; he is an advocate for seventy of his relatives to reach Paradise; he earns the Crown of Glory, whose 
precious stone is better than all this world and everything in it." -Sheik 'Abd-Salam Abu Shukheude, chief mufti of the 
Palestinian Authority Police Force. Barbara Victor, Army of Roses, Inside th e World of Palestinian Wom en Suicide 
Bombers, (London: Constable & Robinson Ltd , 2004 ), p.ll 2 
34Margaret Co1mack ( ed.) , Sacrificing the Self, (New York: Oxford University Press, 200 1 ), p. 81 
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2:2:2 Early Martyrdom and Hadith 
As would be expected from the Qur'anic verses, it is the 'combative', or battlefield 
martyrs who receive the most attention and glory in Hadith literature. The martyrs of 
early Islamic history were predominantly male, as traditionally females did not under 
normal circumstances actively participate and engage in battle.35 This early 
construction of martyrdom took on an 'activist' ideal, 'active combative martyrdom'.36 
It was the martyrs who threw themselves into battle with courage and abandon who 
were the ideal warriors in these early military encounters. Ibn Ishaq's account of 
events on the occasion of at the battle of Badr, in 624, clearly displays 'active 
combative martyrdom' behaviour. The battle at Badr is another of the first important 
battles ofMuhammad's lifetime and Ibn Ishaq's account attributes this battle as one of 
the first times that Muhammad declared that those who were killed in battle, while 
facing the enemy, would enter Paradise. On hearing this, one ofMuharnmad's 
companions, 'Umaryr b. al Humam b. al-Jamuh al-Ansari immediately said 
"Excellent! All that stands between me and entering Paradise is being killed by these 
people!". He then took his sword and plunged into battle, he fought the enemy until 
he was killed.37 Another of Muhammad's companions, Ibn Afra, who had put on his 
armour in preparation for the battle, then asked Muhammad what would be pleasing 
to God? Muhammad answered "It would please God to see you plunge into battle 
without armour." At that Ibn 'Afra removed his armour and fought the enemy until he 
too was killed.38 
35 This is not to say that there are no instances offemale participation in warfare or female battlefield martyrdom, only that 
by a extremely large proportion it is a predominantly male arena. Muhammad's 'favourite' wife A'isha is reported to be 
a great warrior in many Hadith and there are reports that the Kharijite leader Shabib b. Yazid (d. 697 C.E) lead an army 
into battle that included 250 women warriors. Reportedly his mother and wife were among those women, and both were 
martyred in battle. Etan Kohlberg,(l997), p. 7 
36 See: Figure 1, p. 9 
37 
"Martyrdom", Islam and the Muslim World. http: //www .ga le.co m/pdf/samples/sp656032.pdf, (cited: October 14th 2005) 
38 Etan Kohlberg,(1997), p. 7 
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This 'active' approach to 'combative martyrdom' , seeking martyrdom,39 as the sole 
interpretation Islamic martyrdom behaviour did not resonate long within the early Muslim 
community. Note that there is a difference between seeking martyrdom and willingness for 
martyrdom. Seeking or 'active' martyrdom implies that there is a determination for certain 
death, whereas willingness is 'passive' and implies an acceptance of martyrdom, should it 
occur. 
Around 629 during an expedition by Muslims to Mu'ta, Ibn Rawaha was given 
command of the expedition after the two previous commanders were killed in the 
battle. A hadith reports that Ibn Rawaha received an injury, and fearing death he 
withdraw from battle. He later regained his composure and courage, and urged 
himself back into the battle and was killed. The Hadith report then proceeds to 
explain that Muhammad told his companions about the two preceding commanders' 
martyrdoms, and then drew silent for a moment, before reassuring his companions 
that Ibn Rawaha had indeed also died as a martyr. Muhammad's silence represented 
Ibn Rawaha hesitation in the path ofGod.40 This represents the introduction of a new 
approach to martyrdom, in which a warrior does not have to intend to 'actively' seek 
death. A good warrior is willing to risk his life for Islam, but may also wish to come 
out of battle alive and victorious. If they are slain, it is not their urgency or 
determination to seek death that qualifies them as martyrs, rather, it is their 
involvement, 'passive combative martyrdom' .41 This concept of 'passive combative 
martyrdom' is later emphasised by the Sunni tradition after divisions occur in the 
40 Etan Kohl berg,( 1997), p. II 
41 This emphasis can be supported by a number ofQur'anic verse, 4:74 ,9:52 and elsewhere and in the Hadith. 
Let those fight in the cause of Allah Who sell the life of this world for the hereafter. To him who ji.ghteth in th e cause of 
Allah,- whether he is slain or gets victory- Soon shall We g ive him a reward of great (va lue).-Yusuf Ali Q4:74 
Say: "Can you exp ect for us (any fate) other than one of two glorious things- (Martyrdom or vict01y)? But we can v.pectfor 
you either that Allah will send his punishmentji·om Him self, or by our hands. So wait (expectant); we too will wait with 
you. " .-Yusuf Ali Q9 :52 
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Islamic community. However, at this stage, to zealously seek martyrdom in battle, 
'active combative martyrdom', is still the ideal. The above incident signifies only a 
slight adaptation to the concept of martyrdom behaviour but not a fundamental 
change to its nature, which is developed once different jurisprudential traditions 
evolve. 
This initial ideal of 'active martyrdom' behaviour was to later be identified as 'the 
quest for martyrdom', talab al-shahada. Later revaluations by Sunni jurists see the 
concept of martyrdom shift away from this behaviour altogether, to a point where it is 
condemned by the majority ofSunnijurists to this day.42 The discussions above 
suggest that actively seeking martyrdom, 'active combative martyrdom' was the first 
understanding of martyrdom in Islam, and historically there is ample praise for this 
type ofbehaviour. Talab al-shahada through participating in military jihad did not 
remain as an ideal understanding of martyrdom in Islam. In spite of later 
transformations in theological definitions, this notion has re-emerged throughout 
Islamic history. It is an ideology that mobilises revolutionary thought and dissenting 
groups. It is an exceptionally potent tool for cementing loyalty, particularly in rebel 
groups with charismatic leaders. 
The early historical example of an extreme understanding of 'active martyrdom' is 
found with in the Kharijites philosophies.43 The Kharijites are thought to have split 
42 The specific Sunni jurists and scholars are not named. Margaret Cormack ( ed .), Sacrificing the Self, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) , p. 86 
43 The Kharijites are often referred to as the historical origins of the 'suicide bomber'. As will be come clear later, thi s is 
incorrect. Their form of'active martyrdom' is more aligned with the 'combative' than the ' political ' category of'suicide 
bombing' (see Chapter Three). Furthermore, there is a difference between des iring martyrdom because of religious 
conviction or for the cause oflslam (suicide bombing), and desiring martyrdom for the seeking of eschatological reward 
(Kharijites). From a contemporary understanding martyrdom for reward is considered egotistic and impure in intention; 
the impUiity of the intent would negate the martyrdom in the eyes of God . Interviews with failed 'suicide bombers' show 
that the rewards of martyrdom are considered compensation, they are not the primary motivation of undertaking a 
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from the early Muslim community around 657, after a dispute over the issue of 
leadership. 44 The Kharijites, called themselves shurat, or vendors, in reference to the 
Qur'anic praise for those who sell their earthly lives in exchange for Paradise.45 They 
opposed the direction the early Muslim community was heading regarding the issue 
of authority after the death of Muhammad. They took an exclusivist stance, arguing 
that there was no other understanding oflslam but their own. Martyrdom was central 
to Kharijiite thought. There are many reports ofKharijite leaders promoting the desire 
for martyrdom and Paradise to their followers. For Kharijites, martyrdom was not an 
inconvenient possibility of courageous participation in jihad or death for which one 
needs to be compensated; it was the primary goal and intention of participation. 
Furthermore, the Kharijites also demonstrate a shift in the original concept of 
'combative martyrdom'. Contrary to its traditional meaning that defined martyrdom 
as a status achieved only in a battle against non-Muslims, for the Kharijites, 
martyrdom could be achieved through any struggle for justice and purity, even from 
within the Muslim community itself.46 This construction did not fade with the demise 
of the Kharijites, 'active martyrdom' and the identification of the enemy within the 
Muslim community, re-emerges and is practised throughout Islamic history.47 
'suicide bombing' . Nichole Argo, Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs: The Palestinian Case and the Pursuit of 
a Martyrdom Complex. (International Studies Association: website: http: //www.isanet.org, cited: 21 st August 2006) 
Although the Kharijites do not have a direct affect on the development of martyrdom, they are an interesting example of 
extreme 'active martyrdom '. 
44 Daniel Brown, A New Introduction to Islam . (USA: Blackwell Publishing ltd, 2004), p.108 
45 Q4 :74 and 9:112. These verses are favoured by Sayyid Qutb of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
46 
"Martyrdom", Islam and th e Muslim World, http://www.gale.com/pdf/samples/sp656032.pdf, (cited: October 14th 2005) 
47 One such group is the Assassins, a Shi 'a movement in the 12-13 century. The Assassins staged political assassination 
attacks that had an extremely 'high risk' of death, as frequently the 'assassin' would be killed shortly after the mission. 
The group's leader Hasan al Sabbah promised them immediate entry to Paradise if they did die as a result of their 
mission. The Assassin movement is interesting and mistakenly commonly referTed to as the historical foundation of 
suicide bombing. However, they will not be discussed in thi s study, as their actions and understanding of martyrdom do 
not directly affect the evolution of the concept of martyrdom in Islam . 
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2:3 REVALUATION OF MARTYRDOM DUE TO JURISPRUDENTIAL 
TRADITIONS 
As has been illustrated, martyrdom in early Islam was not a static concept, however, 
it was confined to the single category of 'combative' casualties. Although the Qur'an 
does not specifically refer to other categories of martyrdom, the concept is extended 
far from its original meaning soon after the death of Muhammad in 632. Primarily 
martyrdom's meaning altered as a result of the formation of different jurisprudential 
traditions. The Sunnijurists encouraged a quietest 'passive' shift in the concept of 
martyrdom that expands well beyond the 'combative' context. For the Shi'a tradition, 
one of the factors that ultimately distinguished them from the Sunnis is the event of 
Imam Hussein's martyrdom. Hussein's martyrdom is the central basis for their 
understanding of martyrdom and it is central to Shi'ite identity. 
The formation of the Sunni and Shi 'a jurisprudential traditions sees the extension of 
martyrdom to include the category of 'non-combative martyrdom'. Non-combative 
martyrdom is not unique to Islam; it is also identified by Judaism and Christianity. 
However, the historical circumstances around the development ofthe theological 
concept of martyrdom in Islam are very different to either Judaism or Christianity. 
The first generations ofMuslims did not identify the concept of'non-combative 
martyrdom'. Early Muslims enjoyed relatively great political and military success 
after the hijra.48 Although they suffered and were persecuted by non-Muslim groups, 
they mostly suffered under local authorities and from tribal battles. This was 
relatively minor compared to the cases of Christians or Jewry who were persecuted 
under foreign rule and forced to renounce their faith. The Islamic construction of 
'non-combative martyrdom' arose p1imarily as a consequence of internal 
48 Migration, with reference to the early Muslim community' s migration fi·om Mecca to Medina. 
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fragmentation of the Muslim community.49 It is the consequence of these internal 
splits that created radial shifts in the understanding of the concept of martyrdom in 
both the Sunni and Shi'a traditions. As the Shi' a notion of martyrdom grows out of a 
tradition which was historically formed under the Sunni rule, it is crucial to discuss 
the Shi'a understanding before discussing the shifts in the Sunni tradition which seem 
to be a reaction to minority groups under their authority. 
2:3: 1 Shi' a Martyrdom 
2:3:1:1 The Early Construction ofShi 'a Martyrdom 
The word Shi 'a in Arabic means 'followers', technically 'followers of Ali'. The Shi'a 
tradition was formed as a result of disputes over the issue of the succession of 
Muhammad. The Shi'ites believe that the legitimate authority after Muhammad was 
his son-in-law and cousin Ali. They argue that a line of descendants through Ali and 
Fatima, whom they call the "Infallible Imams", should lead the Muslim community. 
However, the majority of Muslims voted for Abu Bakr, Muhammad's trusted friend 
and subsequently the succession of authority was passed to him. Those who believe 
Abu Bakr was the rightful successor became known as the Sunnis, meaning 
'followers of tradition' . 
The concept of martyrdom for Shi'a Islam is a central value and an almost 
unavoidable topic of discussion in all areas of Shi ' a jurisprudence. The shifts in the 
construction ofmrutyrdom for the Shi'a tradition seem to be a direct result of the 
interactions with the central caliphate as a minority group living under the Sunni 
49 Etan Kohl berg, Medieval Views on Martyrdom, (Amsterdam : Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 
1997), p. 19 
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authority. Following the reign of the "Four Righteous Caliphs", the Sunni authorities 
viewed the Shi' a beliefs as a direct challenge to their rule. This condition of authority 
placed the Shi'ites in an oppositional and problematic situation. They were obliged to 
choose between openly expressing their oppositional and threatening views and even 
fighting for them, or remaining quiet about their views and seeking accommodation 
with the Sunni majority system. 5° As a minority group with views that directly 
challenged and threatened the ruling authority, inevitability occasions occurred when 
Shi'ites were imprisoned, persecuted, or killed. It is this problematic jurisprudential, 
theological, and political situation for the Shi 'ites, which resulted in there-
interpretation of the concept of martyrdom into several distinct types that can be 
categorized as 'combative', 'non-combative' and 'political'. The Shi'aposition as a 
minority group under Sunni rule also allowed for the preservation of the 'active' form 
of martyrdom. 51 
2:3:1:2 Shi'a Non- Combative Martyrdom 
Early on, Shi'ites who expressed their views and beliefs, passively or violently, had 
full knowledge they were placing their lives in serious danger. In the early 
Ummayyad period, al-Mughira b. Shu'ba, the governor ofKufa, cursed Ali during 
each Friday prayer. The curse against Ali caused unrest amongst the Kufan Shi'ites 
present at the prayers; their protest resulted in their imprisonment. When five of them 
refused to remain silent about the incident and refused to denounce their association 
with Ali, they were sentenced to death by Mu'awiya. 52 This is one of the first 
50 The behaviour associated with quietest accommodation is known as taqiyya, often understood as 'precautionary 
dissimulation' . There are various forms of taqiyya withi.n the main branch ofShi'ism, the Twelvers, and it has been 
elevated to a central tenet offaith at certain times. Etan Kohlberg, (1997), p. 19 
51 These categories are not always clear-cut. Both the 'combative' and ' non-combative ' categories in the Shi'a tradition tend 
to incorporate political features. 'Political ma1tyrdom ' as a separate category was utilized during the Iranian revolution 
in 1979. 
52 In the Shi'a tradition to lie about ones faith in order to avoid oppression/persecution is a legi timate behaviour with the 
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incidents that motivated the construction of 'active non-combative martyrdom' for 
Shi'a. 53 Among the five executed was Hujr b. Adi (d. 670 C.E), who had been a loyal 
companion of Muhammad. 54 The early narratives surrounding Hujr's death details 
that before his execution Hujr asked to be buried in his bloodstained clothes, 55 
suggesting that he considered himself (or the early Shi'ite writers/story tellers 
considered him) to be comparable, at some level, to the early battlefield martyrs. 56 
Hujr's execution has since been regarded as one ofthe earliest cases ofShi'ite 
martyrdom. Considering him a martyr represents a separation from the early Islamic 
notion of martyrdom which was confined to the 'combative' realm. 
It was not only the faithful resisters that refused to denounce their faith who were 
given the title of martyr through a 'non-combative' construction. As the Shi'a 
jurisprudential institution developed , , Shi 'ite scholars and intellectuals became the 
new threat to the central Sunni authority. The persecution and occasional execution of 
Shi'ite scholars and intellectuals created one of the most honorary categories of 'non-
combative martyrdom' for the Shi'a tradition; one that is still very much alive.57 Two 
early and prominent accounts of martyrs in this category are the scholars Muhammad 
understanding of the concept of taq iyya. 
53 As they were offered the opportunity to renounce their faith but they refused, their martyrdoms are considered 'active', 
but had they been executed purely on the fact that they are Shi'ites, it would be 'passive'. 
5
"The date ofHujr's death differs from source to source, they range from 670-673 C.E. 
55 Etan Kohlberg, (1997), p. 20. 
56 Traditionally it is only 'combative martyrs' that die at the hands of the non-Muslims that are not washed. 
Ahmad reported: "The Prophet, peace be upon him, sa id: "Do not wash those who die as martyrs, for their every wound or 
drop of blood will exude a fragrance like musk on the Day of Judgement." The Prophet, peace be upon him, ordered the 
martyrs of the Battle ofUhud to be buried in their bloodstained clothes. They were not washed, nor any funeral prayer 
offered for them. Ash-Shafi'i sa id: "Burying the martyrs without washing or offering funeral prayer on them may be 
explained by the fact that they shall meet Allah with their wounds exuding fragrance like musk. The honor bestowed on 
them by Allah frees them from the need for funeral prayers by others. Moreover it makes things easier for the surviving 
Muslims, who may have received injuries in battle and fear the enemy's attack, and may be concerned about the security of 
their families and their families' worries about them. Sayyid Saabiq, Fiqh-us-Sunnah , 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/Iaw/fighussunnah/fus4 60.html (cited: 18th August 2006) 
57 Scholarly ' non-combative martyrdom' can be ' passive ' or 'active ' depending on the steadfastness of the scholar and 
whether they are executed for prior works or whether they continue to propagate their ideas although they know they are 
risking their lives. The 20th century Iranian scholar Ali Shari'ati could be considered an 'active ' martyr as he was very vocal 
about his ideas, although he knew it was putting his life at risk. 
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b. Makki al-Amili and Zayn al-Din b.Ali. Muhammad b. Makki al-Amili, from the 
Jabal Ami! region in Southern Lebanon, who were accused of having written 
defamatory propaganda works against the Sunnis. He was taken to Damascus and 
executed in 1384. Two centuries later, Zayn al-Din b. Ali, also from the Jabal Amil 
region, was arrested by the Ottoman authorities after a Sunni judge accused him of 
heresy. The circumstances surrounding Zayn al-Din b. Ali's death are unreliable but 
the Shi'ites believe he was killed by the Sultan's agents in 1558.58 Shi'ites later 
designated these two scholars the honoured titles of"First and Second Martyrs", 
respectively.59 
2:3:1:3 The Martyrdom of Imam Hussein 
The central and most prominent narrative of martyrdom in Shi'a history and an event 
that has significantly shaped Shi'ajurisprudence is that of the third Imam, Ali's 
second son Hussein. Hussein's death is seen as the event that cemented the difference 
between the Sunni and Shi'a traditions. The meaning and understanding ofthis 
prominent event has been re-interpreted in various contexts due to changing political 
and social situations. However, the basic outline of the event of the martyrdom of 
Hussein has been reported consistently throughout history. Hussein refused to pay the 
oath of alliance to Yazid the ruling Caliph ofthe Umayyads. He believed Yazid was 
an unjust and corrupt ruler and not an appropriate person to guide the Muslim 
community. Hussein wrote to the Shi'ites in Kufa and asked for alliance and they 
promised him their support. Hussein led a small force ofShi'ite men from Medina, 
destine for Kufa. However, when Hussein and his men reached Karbala, they were 
58 Some place his date of death in 1559 . 
59 Etan Kohlberg, (1997), p. 20 . 
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meet by a very large army sent by Yazid. A battle ensued. On the lOth 
(approximately) of October 680 Hussein was slain, along with many members of his 
family and his small army endured large numbers of causalities.60 The traditional 
understanding ofHussein's death is that he sacrificed himself for justice, to revive the 
religion of the Prophet Muhammad and save it from destruction. Since that day in 680 
C.E the anniversary of Hussein's death has been known as Ashura, 61 a time to 
commemorate and mourn the martyrdom ofHussein. 
Shi'ites identifY Hussein's martyrdom as a distinct event in their history and 
understand it differently from the earlier construction of martyrdom in Islam. His 
death can be understood within the context of jihad, and defined under the category 
of 'combative martyrdom' , historically, this is the dominant reading of the event.62 
However, the context in which he was killed makes his martyrdom distinct. First, 
Hussein's position as an Imam and as a descendant of Muhammad divinely validated 
his actions according to Shi'a understanding. Second, Hussein went into the battle 
against the very large army ofYazid's, he was aware that, with his small force, there 
was no chance of victory. Hussein and his army knew that the battle was all but lost 
from the beginning. Third, Hussein's and his army's martyrdoms were not the result 
of being in the battle for expanding the Islamic Caliphate; it was martyrdom at the 
hands of the Caliphate, an unjust Caliphate. These distinctions have the potential to 
significantly change the construction of martyrdom. 
Hussein and his army were greatly out-numbered and had little, to no chance of 
60 Manochehr Dorraj,"Symbolic and Utilitarian Political Value of a Tradition: Martyrdom in the Iranian Political Culture", 
The Review of Politics 59:3 (Summer, 1997): p.499 
61 Yitzhak Nakash, "An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of Ashura", Die Welt des !slams 33:2 (November 1993 ), 
p. 162 
62 The contemporary understanding is that Hussein was a political martyr. 
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victory, this makes the possibility of being killed extremely high. Depending on how 
the narrative is read, this has the potential to make the event of martyrdom an ' active' 
participation. In addition, there is a significant shift in the understanding of 
'combative' enemy. The opposition in the battle were not from an outside community 
of unbelievers; the enemy was within the Muslim community itself Thus, the focus 
of the uprising was to seek justice and purity within the community. Because the 
battle was not undertaken to advance the reign oflslam, it has enhanced potential to 
serve as a symbolic event and can be read readily as sacrifice. Since the foundation of 
Shi'ism, martyrdom has become intrinsically connected with the concept ofjustice. 
Modem Shi'a ideologues have created a sophisticated ideology of activism and 
revolution out of the doctrine of martyrdom based on the narrative ofHussein 's 
death. 63 
2:3:2 Sunni Martyrdom 
2:3:2:1 Early Constructions ofSunni Martyrdom 
For the Sunni tradition, there was a shift to a 'passive' approach to martyrdom and the 
removal of emphasis on 'combative martyrdom'. One of the primary reasons that 
Sunni jurists discourse developed a 'passive' approach was their attempt to amplifY 
their disassociation from dissenting groups like the Kharijites and to create distance 
from the Shi ' ites, both of whom placed significant emphasis on martyrdom in this 
context. As mentioned above, the Kharijite sect was a dissenting group that placed a 
great deal of emphasis on talab al-shahada, ' active martyrdom' and as Hussein 's 
narrative demonstrates ' active martyrdom ' has the potential to be central to Shi 'a 
jurisprudence. In response, Sunni jurists endeavoured to remove any emphasis on 
63C hapter three will di scuss this. 
31 
'active martyrdom' or the seeking of the eschatological rewards of martyrdom in their 
jurisprudential approach. Sunni jurists have justified this ideological shift in the 
understanding of martyrdom by prohibiting talab al-shahada, 'active martyrdom', 
arguing that talab al-shahada or intentionally and actively seeking martyrdom can be 
categorised as suicide,64 which is forbidden in Islam. 
2:3:2:2 Suicide and Martyrdom 
Suicide, intihar,65in Islam has, by long-held consensus, been prohibited under any 
circumstance. The basic reasoning for the prohibition is based on the belief that life is 
a sacred gift from God and human beings may not control its end. The classical 
understanding of suicide is as an act of self-murder, qatal al-nafs. With a prohibition 
on self-murder, there is an avoidable and problematic grey area between suicide and 
martyrdom, specifically 'active martyrdom'. This issue is not unique to Islam but the 
subject of much discussion and debate for Christianity and Judaism as well. Muslim 
scholars, particularly Sunni scholars, have attempted for many centuries to precisely 
define the borderline between the two. The distinction is made by intention, niyyah .66 
Without the proper motivation and intention, one does not fulfil the qualification of a 
64 Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
LawJournal27 (December 2003): p. 323 and A. J. Wensinck, The Oriental Doctrine of the Martyrs. (Amsterdam, 
1921), p.152. Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies Volume Two. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971 ), p.352, notes 
that the process of opening up the category of martyrdom as a reaction against 'seeking martyrdom' is not isolated to 
Islam, a similar process occurred among the Christians in Spain. 
Note: That even participating in a battle with a smaller number of troops on your side than the opposition is considered to be 
comparable to suicide by some Sunni jurists, as the changes of dying are higher. 
65 Intihar, suicide, comes from the root verb nahara, literally meaning 'to slaughter'. The verb is usually used in reference to 
animals. Intihar implies to 'slaughter oneself. The term Intihar, however does not appear in the Qur'an, even though the 
word appears to have been in use at the time. See, Mustapha Jawad, People Who Committed Suicide in Pre-Islamic and 
Islamic Times, (Cairo: Halal, 1934 ). The nearest term to suicide that does appear in the Qur'an is the term, qatal nafs, 
read by modem commentators to mean self-killing. Nadia Dabbagh, Suicide in Palestine: Narratives of Despair, 
(Massachusetts : Olive Branch Press, 2005), p.25 
66 Intention, or niyyah, is central to Islamic thought, if acts are preformed without the proper intentions then the 
requirements are not fulfil and the action becomes 'void' in Gods eyes. The act of martyrdom is judged under niyyah . 
The community is not in the position to judge who is and who has not technically qualified as a martyr, as according to 
Islamic understanding humans are not able to accurately judge the intentions and sincerity of others, this is in God's 
hands alone. Consequent! y all deaths that conform to the construction of martyrdom from the jurisprudential traditions 
understanding are treated with the respect of a martyr and receive the funeral rites of a martyr, leaving the ultimate 
judgement to God. 
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marytr. 67 With the 'passive' shift in Sunni jurisprudence on martyrdom, it was 
generally considered that ifthere is any possible relationship between the man's death 
and his own will or a desire not pure in intent, the action would fall under the banner 
of suicide and would thereby be condemned. Thus 'active martyrdom', talab al-
shahada, and is considered prohibited from a traditional Sunni jurisprudential 
understanding. 
The historical battlefield incident used by Sunni jurists to support the prohibition of 
'active martyrdom' does not come from Hadith, but from an event that occurred after 
the death ofMuhammad, that has been ascribed special significance by Sunni 
jurists.68 The report refers to Bara' ibn Malik, a courageous and experienced warrior 
for the Islamic cause. Bara' had for most his military career desired the glory of 
martyrdom. The important incident occurs in one particular battle against the army of 
Musailamah69 (one of the battles during the 'Apostasy Wars' that occurred shortly 
after Muhammad's death). Abu Bakr, the first caliph, commanded his army to meet 
Musailamah's army with force. Musailamah's army garrisoned itself in a fort and put 
up a strong resistance. Abu Bakr's army were receiving heavy losses and were unable 
to penetrate the fort. At this point Bara' suggests that he should be catapulted over the 
walls of the fort and then open the gates for his army from the inside. The account of 
this incident specifies that Bara' knew that he would face certain death in this 
endeavour but volunteered for the plan primarily due to his desire for martyrdom. The 
plan was successful, and Bara' (miraculously) was not killed. However, Bara' was so 
67Margaret Cormack ( ed.), (200 I), p . 81 
68Bemard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law ofWar: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
Law Journal 27 (December 2003 ), p.325 
The use of this narrative is probably because the prohibition against 'active martyrdom' was a construction of the post-
conquest era and not reflected in that Hadith , which place 'active martyrdom ' as the ideal fonn of martyrdom. 
6~usailamah , sometimes refered to as Musailamah the Liar, claimed to be a prophet of God, he and hi s followers refused 
to acknowledge Abu Bakr as the successor to the Prophet Muhammad and refused to acknowledge to rule of the Islamic 
State. 
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severely injured he should have been dead. He complained to Abu Bakr about his 
failure at achieving martyrdom, to which Abu Bakr replied "Strive for death and you 
will live!". The commentary surrounding this narrative suggests that God denied 
Bara' martyrdom because he desired it, seeking death primarily for his own benefit, 
rather than fighting for the justice of God's cause.70 Sunni jurists and scholars used 
this incident to illustrate true martyrdom, and the distinction between 'passive 
martyrdom' and suicide. Even though Bara' also sought to further the way of God, he 
intended to die a martyr, and as a result, his action was comparable to suicide. Thus 
identification of' active martyrdom' as suicide de-legitimised the minority or 
dissenting groups' prominent understanding of it and placed them as heretics within 
Sunni thought. 
2:3:2:3 Sunni Non-Combative Martyrdom 
The urge for disassociation from the Kharijites and to create jurisprudential distance 
from the Shi'ites, may not have been the only factor responsible for this shift in the 
construction of martyrdom in Sunni thought. The Sunni political situation may have 
played a significant role in the shift to emphasise the 'non-combative martyrdom' 
over 'combative martyrdom'. Historical evidence suggests that the reconstruction of 
the notion of martyrdom in Sunni jurisprudence coincides with the end of the 
conquest era. 71 The post-conquest era saw the disbanding of Arab tribal armies, the 
formation of urban societies, and the gradual establishment of a more stable political 
authority, which in tum was detrimental to the both the opportunity and importance of 
'combative martyrdom'. During the post-conquest era, Hadith and jurisprudential 
literature demonstrated an expansion in the categorization of martyrdom, a 
70 Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
Law Jou rna/27 (December 2003 ), p.325 
71 Approximately 632-750 
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transformation that was drastically different from its original defmition.72 
One of the new categories that appeared was 'passive non-combative accidental 
martyrdom'. Victims of drowning, pleurisy, plague, accidental building collapse, and 
childbirth were considered qualifications to be called martyrs. Other reports include 
death in defence of property, death by accident while engaging in hajj, death from 
falling off a mountain, and death from being eaten by lions.73 The deceased were 
granted the honoured title shahid and understood to be rewarded direct access to 
Paradise. Most of the new categories are cases of death by incident that is particularly 
violent, sudden, or painful, suggesting that there was a need to somehow assure 
compensation and, thus allow these deaths to be considered as atonement for sins and 
grant the victims special treatment in the afterlife.74 These new categories reflect an 
attempt by Sunni jurists and scholars to make martyrdom more accessible to people in 
the stable political environment of the post-conquest era, which had limited access to 
situations that may afford the chance of 'combative martyrdom'. The incidents that 
make up this category of martyrdom stress an 'accidental 'nature to encourage a 
'passive' intention, in accordance with the attempt to dissociate with 'active' 
martyrdom. In addition, this category indicates the reshaping of gender boundaries 
by making the rewards of martyrdom accessible to females who did not traditionally 
partake in military jihad. 
72 
'Combative martyrdom' was still considered to be ofhigh virtue; however, it was not emphasized as the opportunities for 
'combative martyrdom' were not highly available. 
73 Once such Hadith reports," . .. The Apostle of Allah (peace_ be_ upon_ him) said: There are seven types of martyrdom in 
addition to being killed in Allah's cause: one who dies of plague is a martyr; one who is drowned is a martyr; one who 
dies of pleurisy is a martyr; one who dies of an internal complaint is a martyr; one who is burnt to death is a martyr; who 
one is killed by a building falling on him is a martyr; and a woman who dies while pregnant is a martyr." Sunan Abu 
Dawud, Book 20 , Number 3105 . http ://www .usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/searchhadith.htm l, (cited: 12th August 2006) 
74Margaret Cormack ( ed.), Sacrificing the Self, (New York: Oxford University Press, 200 1 ), p. 82 
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2:3:2:2 The Removal of Death 
Although different from 'combative martyrdom' in context and intentional behaviour, 
the 'passive non-combative martyrdom' category still requires death as the central 
factor for being qualified a martyr. However, Sunni jurists and scholars expanded this 
'passive non-combative' category further by equating various religious activities with 
martyrdom, 'passive non-combative duty'. Consequently, this removed death 
altogether. It was no longer death in the 'path of God', which qualified a Muslim as a 
martyr, but rather being merely a Muslim itself that could in some circumstances 
bring a Sunni Muslim to the level of a martyr. Hadith literature suggests that the 
honour of a martyr is transferable to any Muslim who fulfils their religious duties 
with a marked degree of zeal. This category includes those who read the Qur'an for 
God's sake,75 those who perform daily pray obediently, and those who undertake a 
blameless pilgrimage.76 As martyrdom became a topic of discussion and debate in 
Sunni religious scholarship, scholars and intellectuals, and the caller to prayer (those 
devoted to the work of God), became qualified for the honour of martyrdom. This 
type of martyrdom became understood as the category of martyrdom that superseded 
the significance of all other categories: 
"The ulama in their own interest composed a prophetic saying in which 
their merit is reckoned as higher than that of the Shuhada and the ink 
which flows from the pens of the learned is recognised to be of more 
value than the blood of martyrs shed in war for faith . "77 
In these literatures, it is reported that the reciters of the Qur'an and the leaders of 
daily prayers receive the reward of 40,000 martyrs. 78 
75 Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies Volume Two, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971 ), p.352 
76 A. J. Wensinck, Th e Oriental Doctrine of the Martyrs, (Amsterdam, 1921 ), p.154 
77 Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies Volume Two, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971 ), p.35 2, 
78 It is not mentioned what specific literatures report this. Margaret Com1ack (ed.), Sacrificing the Self, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 83 
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2:4 CONCLUSION 
The various interpretations of martyrdom in early Islam were driven chiefly by the 
formation of different jurisprudential traditions in the Muslim community due to 
debate over the issue of central authority. The Shi' a ideal reinterpretation of 
martyrdom allows for 'active' martyrdom in 'combative'/9 'non-combative', and 
'political' constructions and is a direct result of their position as a minority group 
under Sunni authority. The concept of martyrdom becomes crucial to Shi'a political 
thought and reflects their struggle against injustice and oppression. The Shi 'a 
understanding ofthe nature of martyrdom is articulated in the narrative ofHussein's 
martyrdom at the hands ofYazid. Hussein's martyrdom narrative preserved the 
possibility of 'active martyrdom' , although throughout history Shi'ites have followed 
relatively quietest symbolic approach to this narrative.80 The Sunni approach is 
motivated by both a 'passive' and 'non-combative' impulse. Their jurisprudential 
reinterpretation of the concept of martyrdom reflects their position as the central 
authority ofthe Caliphate. Sunni reinterpretations prohibit 'active martyrdom' , 
favoured by dissenting and minority groups, by associating it with suicide. This 
prohibition of' active martyrdom' creates jurisprudential distance and allows the 
dissenting groups to be identified as heretics. Their concept of martyrdom also 
signifies attempts to sustain political stability, by demilitarizing martyrdom, and 
opening up the 'non-combative' category, martyrdom becomes more accessible to 
Muslims in the post-conquest era. 
79 Unti l the occultation of the Twelfth Imam. See footnote: 48 
80 Giles Kepel, Jihad: Th e Trail of Political Islam , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.38 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC 
SCHOLARSHIP AND THE REVIVAL OF MARTYRDOM 
3:1 INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of 'post-colonialism' and increasing western influence in the Middle East in 
the 20th century, Islamic 'revivalist' movements revitalised the importance of the 
concept of martyrdom and jihad, a process that would ultimately provided the basis for 
the Islamic 'suicide bomber'. This chapter will assess the ideological shifts that 
occurred in the concept of martyrdom and jihad. It will show that while 'suicide 
bombing' did not occur as a simple development out of either the revivalist Sunni or 
revivalist Shi'a movements, there are ideological parallels that would have allowed for 
the possibility of the 'suicide bombing' as a form of martyrdom if the revivalist Shi'a 
concept of martyrdom was reinterpreted into a revivalist Sunni notion ofjihad. 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the revivalist Shi'a scholars' discourse on 
martyrdom, focusing on the works ofKhomeini and Shari'ati. Shari'ati's individualized 
reinterpretation of the historical narrative of Hussein's martyrdom into the 
contemporary Iranian political situation created the philosophy for revolutionary 
martyrdom. Khomeini's own ideas on martyrdom were heavily influenced by Shari'ati's 
martyrdom philosophy, and he utilized the philosophy during the Iran-Iraq war, creating 
the 'active political martyr'; the martyr who choose to die, in order for his death to serve 
as a symbolic tool against the 'oppressor'. This analysis highlights that the actual 
concept of martyrdom that is apparent in the later development of the 'suicide bomber 
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martyr' originates for this Shi'a form of 'active political martyrdom' . 
The analysis ofthe revivalist Sunni scholars' discourse on jihad will focus on the 
works ofMawdudi, Al-Banna and Qutb. The Sunni revivalist understanding of jihad, 
typified by Qutb, asserted pan-Islamic aggressive notion ofjihad, it which it is every 
individual Muslims' duty to participate. The jihad was focused against the western 
'oppressor', who keeps the present-day Muslim societies in a state of constantjahiliyya 
(ignorance). The comparative analysis of the revivalist movements will show that both 
assert an individualized response to the contemporary situation ofthe Islamic world, 
and both understand the enemy as the 'oppressor'. It is these parallel ideologies that will 
later create a complementary basis that will allow for the development ofthe Islamic 
'suicide bomber'. As they provide an ideological basis that will allow the 'active 
political martyr' who can die, and the Qutbianjihadi, who can kill, to integrate. 
3:2 SHJ'A AND MARTYRDOM 
The narrative ofHussein's martyrdom is the crux in the development of the Islamic 
'suicide bomber' martyr. As discussed in the previous chapter, Hussein martyrdom is a 
central event for the understanding ofmartyrdom in the Shi'a tradition. Furthermore, 
Hussein is a central figure in the conception ofShi'a identity and his martyrdom is 
commemorated annually by Shi'ites during the Ashura celebration. There is no 
correlating figure in the concept of martyrdom in the Sunni tradition. 
Although Hussein's martyrdom has always been a powerful event and idea in Shi'a 
religious thought, its political significance has waxed and waned. Until the nineteenth 
century the event's significance was approached and understood primarily from a 
quietest and pragmatic philosophical standing. The Ashura ceremonies associated with 
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Hussein's martyrdom were in the form of commemorations and lamentations ofhis 
death as opposed to celebrations. They consisted of mourning, weeping, and self-
flagellation. These commemorations were founded on the merit of mourning and the 
achievement of salvation through the re-enactment ofHussien's grief and suffering. 
This interpretation of the martyrdom was on, a basic conceptual level, comparable to the 
Christian concept of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, in the understanding that Hussein 
suffered and was killed, in a sense to purify the Muslims community's corruption and to 
vindicate the Shi'a cause. 81 It was not until the middle of the twentieth century, with a 
growing distrust over western influence in Iran and in Iraq, that the Ashura 
commemorations took on a new meaning. The dominant quietest philosophical 
approaches' influence began to wane, and revolutionary revivalist ideologies gained a 
sustained influential position, exerting their presence in the political realm, an area 
neglected during the quietest era. 82 As the oppositions against Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi's policies mounted in Iran and the issue of injustice become the primary area of 
contention, similarly the issue of injustice was read as the dominant cause ofHussein's 
martyrdom. Hussein's martyrdom myth, as an effective means for making sense of the 
surrounding social and political reality, was both realised and utilised, becoming 
inspiration for political activism,83 and ultimately, it would become a model for political 
martyrdom. 
3:2:1 The Introduction ofThe New Concept of Martyrdom 
81 Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
LawJoumal27 (December 2003): p. 333 
82 Giles Kepel , Jihad: Th e Trail of Political Islam , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.38 
83 Jill Swenson, Martyrdom: Mytho-Cathexis and the Mobilization of the Masses in th e Iranian Revolution , (Chicago: 
American Anthropological Association, 1985), p.123 
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It was out ofNajaf, Iraq, 84 and Qom, Iran, in the 1960's that significant shifts in Shi'a 
jurisprudence and ideologies on martyrdom first began to appear. The newly installed 
Ba'ath party was in power in Baghdad, 85 and they were beginning to construct their new 
order in Iraq. The Sunni elite in Baghdad were benefiting from the oil boom, while the 
Shi'ite population in the south of Iraq remained comparatively impoverished and 
suffered increasingly from the Ba'ath party's regime, becoming a target of 
discrimination and oppression. The religious discourse that began to appear out ofNajaf 
at this time introduced ideas centred on a reinterpretation ofShi'a history and are-
evaluation of the Shi'a role within the larger Islamic community. The ulema ofNajaf 
began to discuss the responsibility of the Shi'ite ulema in saving the Islamic umma from 
what was perceived to be oblivion at the hands of colonialism and secularism.86 This 
predicament called for Shi'ites to exert their religious and political presence over the 
ruling elite and the corrupt colonial rulers. To fulfil this responsibility required a new 
form of revivalist Shi'ism, and ultimately an Islamic Revolution. This called for a 
reinterpretation ofthe concept of martyrdom, through a reinterpretation of the narrative 
ofHussein's martyrdom into the contemporary political situation. 
In terms of discourse on martyrdom, the most prominent theoreticians out ofNajaf and 
Qom included, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980), Ayatollah Ruhallah 
Khomeini (1900-1989), Ayatollah Talequani ( 1903-1979) and later Muhammad 
Hussein Fadlullah (1935- ). Khomeini was the most influential to the developments of 
martyrdom in contemporary Shi'a thought. Khomeini's ideas on martyrdom began to 
84 Najaf, Iraq has for many centuries been the home of important and influential theological colleges and institutions. Najaf 
institutions have played a central role in the development of the Twelver (Jafari) school oflslamic Jurisprudence. 
85 In Iraq the Ba'ath party brietl y came to power in 1963, and then seized power officially in 1968 . Robin Wright, In The 
Name Of God: The Khomeini Decade, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p.82 
86 Ulema: Muslim scholars trained in Islam and Islamic law . 
Umma: Islamic Community. 
Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law ofWar: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
Law Journa/27 (December 2003 ): p. 333 
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develop before his exile from Iran in 1964.87 Khomeini had been an active critic and 
vigorous protester ofboth the ruling Shah and the Pahlavi regime; however, it was in 
1963, when the Pahlevi regime sent paratroopers into a masdrasa88 in Qom, killing a 
number of students that Khomeini' s ideas gained potency and began to resonated within 
the public sphere. During the Ashura commemorations following the killings, Khomeini 
gave a mobilising historical speech in Qom, promoting those who died at the madrasa 
to a higher status, not as shah ids, but the elevated status of 'the companions of Hussein' 
on the grounds of suffering under oppression.89 Khomeini paralleled the policies of the 
Shah government with the tyranny and oppression of Y azid rule. He was arrested by the 
SA V AK two days after the speech.90 This ultimately resulted in his exile from Iran. He 
briefly moved to Turkey, before settling in Najaf, Iraq in 1965.91 In Najaf, his 
prominence as an intellectual and religious figure continued to grow. 
One of the first significant publications out ofNajafthat displays Khomeini's ideas on 
martyrdom, was authored by Khomeini's student Ni'matollah Salihi Najaf-adabi, in 
1968. The pamphlet called "Shahid-e Javid ","The Eternal Martyr'', contained the 
contemporary interpretation of Hussein's martyrdom as a political sacrifice and 
promoted Hussein's political activism as an inspiration to all Shi'ites. The "Eternal 
Martyr" claimed that Hussein went to battle not because he sought dynastic power, the 
Sunni understanding, and not because he was following his divine fate, the dominant 
quietest Shi'a understanding, but as a calculated and conscious action against an 
oppressive regime. Thus his martyrdom was the ultimate sacrifice in his commitment to 
revolution against an unjust and oppressive political regime, not an action of divine 
87 Roy Mottahedeh , Th e Mantle of th e Prophet, (London: Peregrine, 1987), p.398 
88 Religious school. 
89 Ervand Abrahamian,. Khom einism, (London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd , 1993), p.29 
90 SAY AK is the intelligence service during the Shah's time. 
91 Roy Mottahedeh, Th e Mantle of th e Prophet, (London: Peregrine, 1987), p.187 , 398 
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nature.92 
As a result of this new interpretation ofHussein's martyrdom, Ashura commemoration 
in Iran and Iraq began to evolve and grew increasingly volatile and political in nature. 
By 1974, the commemoration in Iraq had developed into violent political protests 
against the Ba'ath party and over the following years Ashura protests became 
exceedingly more violent each year. In 1977, the Iraqi Government outlawed all Ashura 
commemorations, creating a tumultuous climate of unrest in the Shi'ite communities. 
The prohibition of Ashura commemorations ultimately resulted in many political trials 
and widespread persecution and executions ofShi'ite Iraqis. The political trails fed into 
the revitalized Ashura myth and legitimized its new political nature and its cause. These 
events can be seen as important concrete evidence of the implications and power of 
Shi'a ulemas' reinterpretations of the notion ofHussein's martyrdom.93 They can be 
directly attributed to the religious discourses on martyrdom that had been produced in 
Naja£ 
3:2:2 Ayatollah Khomeini 
Khomeini built an influential position in Najaf, while also managing to sustain his 
influence in Iran. When Khomeini gave seminars in the theological centre ofNajaf, 
Iranian pilgrims to Iraq recorded them, allowing for the production of cassettes and 
religo-political tracts which where then smuggled back and distributed in Iran. In 1978, 
the Ba'athist Government grew nervous ofKhomeini's influence and he was sent into 
92 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism, (London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1993), p.29 
93Bemard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law ofWar: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
Law Journal 27 (December 2003): p. 338 
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exile again. After no other Islamic country allowed him entry, he settled in France.94 
It is through the way in which Khomeini utilises the two words mostazafin (oppressed) 
and shahid (martyr) in his writings that we can see a transformation in his ideas. In his 
very early writings, he would use the word mostazafin in the traditional Qur'anic sense, 
the humble, passive, meek believers, particularly orphans, widows and the handicapped. 
In the 1970's, mostazafin was used as a word to represent the angry poor, the exploited 
and downtrodden masses.95 The category of representation undergoes further extension 
after the revolution to include the middle classes that actively support the revolution. 
Similarly, the word shahid underwent a process of transformation. In Khomeini's very 
early writing, he rarely uses the word and, when he does, shahid is used in the 
conventional sense with reference to famous Shi'ite martyrs, such as Hussein. He never 
used shahid to represent the average person killed. By the early 1960's, those killed 
against a 'tyrant' regime in protest or uprisings are given elevated status. Their death 
takes on a significance, and they are given the titled bicharehha (unfortunate ones).96 
Shortly before the Revolution, while in France, Khomeini ideas on the concept of 
martyrdom begin to thrive, probably due to the influence ofthe theories of Ali Shari'ati, 
who was enjoying relative popularity in Iran at the tirne.97 He extends the boundary of 
the category of martyr to include almost anyone killed, in any sense, for the Shi'a cause; 
they became 'glorious shah ids', revolutionary martyrs.98 
Khomeini's exile to France was beneficial for propagating his message. From his Paris 
base, Khomeini was able to develop and produce more on his political ideas, as there 
94 Bernard K. Freamon,(December 2003.) p. 339 
95 Ervand Abrahamian, (1993 ), p.27 
96 Ervand Abrahamian, (1993 ), p.27 
97 Although Khomeini never publicly admitted influence from Shari 'ati 's writings, there are similar qualities, and both 
scholars' works certainl y re-enforced each o ther within Iranian public opinion. 
98 Ervand Abrahamian, ( 1993 ), p.27 
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were fewer governmental restraints. His sermons, that were sent back to Iran, were 
carefully directed towards the youth audience, rather than the clerical elite, as he did not 
want to alienate potential allies.99 Daniel Bromberg, in his article Khomeini's Legacy: 
Islamic Rule and Islamic Social Justice, suggests that in retrospect it becomes clear that 
this targeting of the youth audience was in the hope of inspiring them to take a political 
stance, and they did. Khomeini seems to have had an agenda, hoping for and 
anticipating the killing of the youth protesters by the Shah, which would encourage 
Iranians to identify themselves with Hussein and result in the comparison of the Shah 
with the 'tyrant' Yazid. After the success of the Revolution, he used the narrative to 
firmly secure the current political situation within a prominent Shi'ite historical event. 
Thus in a chaotic environment of economical suffering and oppression, Khomeini was 
seen as the hopeful alternative, a leader of absolute good, a leader with a conviction to 
resist evil and a leader who was prepared to lead his people into the light. 100 
Ultimately Khomeini's popularity spread and his vision of an Islamic state in Iran carne 
true. Many of the Iranian clerics whom Khomeini taught in Najafwere installed in 
positions in the new Islamic government in Tehran. Of these clergy, the one who 
centred his understanding of an Islamic revolution based on martyrdom was Ayatollah 
Talequani. His definition of martyrdom took form at Najaf, but gained influence once 
the Islamic government was in place in Tehran. 
In short, anyone who has understood the truth and divine goal and has stood for 
it, sacrificing his life, is called shahid in the terminology of the Qur'an and 
jurisprudence. The shahid is the one who has experienced the shuhud (vision) of 
truth. The sacrifice of his own life is not based on illusion or agitation of his 
emotions. He has seen the truth and the goal. That is why he has chosen to 
wallow in the blood and the dust. Such a person does so with the intention of 
intimacy with God, not on the basis of fantasies and personal desires. He is 
above these worldly matters. He has understood the value of truth . .. A shahid is 
the one who understands religion, knows hi s God, and believes in the hereafter 
99 Amir Taheri , Th e Spirit of Allah : Khomeini and th e Islamic Revolution , (USA: Adler and Adler, 1986), p.l31-2 
100 R. Scott Appleby, Spokesm en for th e Despised: Fundam entalist Leaders of the Middle East, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), p.37-38 
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as well as in eternal life. He must realise the goal. Then because he has seen the 
truth, he has no fear of death. Death is easy for him. 101 
Talequani's ideas on martyrdom are a good example of the religious interpretations of 
the significance of martyrdom in the contemporary situation. His concepts are very 
similar to those of Ali Shari'ati, specifically the promotion of sacrifice and the need to 
realise the importance of martyrdom. 
3:2:3 Shari'ati on Martyrdom and Jihad 
It seems that much ofKhomeini's and Talequani's rhetoric was based around, or at least 
received an important boost by the ideas of Ali Shari'ati. Shari'ati was originally a 
schoolteacher; he held a doctorate in sociology from the Sorbonne and was the son and 
grandson of influential Iranian religious scholars. Although he was not a cleric and was 
not directly involved with the religious discourse in Najaf or Qom during the time, he 
produced a number of religious works, which played an essential role in the ideological 
development of revolutionary religious ideology that occurred within the greater Iranian 
society. It could be argued that Shari'ati is the most influential scholar in the ideological 
development in the concept of martyrdom that resulted in the 'suicide bomber' .102 
Shari'ati's writings were influenced considerably by his philosophical studies in France, 
he was fascinated by Western schools of thought, such as Marxism and 
existentialism. 103 He considered himself to be a 'God worshipping socialist' and showed 
little respect to the traditional role ofShi'ite clerics in Najaf and Qom. He gave old 
tradition religious narratives a modem spin by integrating them with the themes of 
101 Ayatollah Talequani, cited i.n: Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law ofWar: A Short Legal 
History," Fordham International LawJouma/27 (December 2003): p. 339 
102 Shari'ati is often overlooked in studies on 'suicide bombing'. The next chapter will illustrate that Shari'ati's philosophy 
of martyrdom can be seen in the current developments in the tactic use of'suicide bombing' by Sunni groups. 
103 Janet Afary, Shi'i Narratives of Karbala and Christian Rites of Penance: Michel Foucault and th e Cu lture of._ the Iranian 
Revolution, 1978-1979, http:muse. jhu.edu/ journals/radical history review/v086/86.1 afary.html (cited: 22" March 
2006), p. 10 
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Western leftist thought. 104 It was Shari 'ati who introduced the expressions 'Red Shi'ism', 
his view ofShi'ism was as a revolutionary force and a tradition, which has been 
constructed on uprising against injustice. 105 He criticized the Safavid interpretation of 
Shi'ism that allowed for the legitimacy of an oppressive govemment. 106 
3:2:3:1 Shari 'ati on Martyrdom 
Martyrdom was the central concept for Shari'ati's vision ofShi'ism; he elevated it 
above all else and interpreted Hussein's martyrdom to be the defining moment of Shi'ite 
history. Shari'ati was a gifted writer and speaker and his two central works of 
martyrdom, 'Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness' and 'Jihad and Shahadat' are 
exceptionally poetic and powerful. 107 In his discussions of martyrdom, Shari'ati relies 
heavily on the notion of the individual. He positions his discussions to directly address 
the individual and constructs a feeling of personal responsibility in the narrative of 
Hussein. He develops the notion of'constructing a revolutionary self or a political 
'consciousness-rising'. 108 It is the political consciousness of individuals that Shari'ati 
considers the essence that leads a revolution to victory. This consciousness is a political 
preparedness for death and the sacrifice of ones life. 109 He formulated his theories based 
on defining the 'secret of victory', which to Shari' ati is articulated in a demand for 
104 This approach made his work more popular to the educated youth of Iran. By 1969 he had built a reputation as a 
powerful lecturer and had acquired a mass following. His lectures were recorded and distributed to a large audiences and 
his controversial ideas where discussed widely, causing much jealousy and resentment from the traditional Shi'ite clergy. 
His leftist position was seen as a threat by the Shah regime, and following a series of confrontations, Shari'ati left Iran in 
1977 . He died shortly afterwards in London, reportedly from a heart attack at the age of forty- four, however there is 
speculation that he was actually killed by the SA V AK. 
105 The colour red in 'Red Shi ' ism' was chosen to represent the blood of the bodies ofHussein and his men, and to refer to 
an association with western leftist thought. 
106 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p.41 
107 Shari'ati's works are available in English translation from his official website The Official Website of Dr. Ali Shari'ati, 
http://www.shariati.com/, (cited: 22nd March 2006) 
100 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p.41 
109 This is not the same as a consciousness to commit oneself to the conditions of martyrdom for reason of personal interest 
or for egotism, which would be suicide. For Shi 'a theology, as with Sunni, the distinction between suicide and 
martyrdom is based on intention. However, for Shi'a theology it is personal intention, not behavioural intention. Thus, a 
martyrdom can physically mimic a suicide, but if the personal intention behind taking ones own life is pure for the cause 
of God it is legitimate. 
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sacrifice via 'active martyrdom' in the uprising against injustice, an issue, which, 
according to him, is more important than life itself Shari'ati's discourse on martyrdom 
is constructed around and legitimized by a unique interpretation ofHussein's 
martyrdom. Shari'ati's reading creates two important shifts in the Shi'a constructions of 
martyrdom; it removes the condition ofjihad and it creates a symbolic death. 
3:2:3:1 Shari'ati's Hussein 
Shari'ati's provides an existentialist reading of the narrative ofHussein's uprising 
against Yazid. 110 Shari'ati makes an absolute division in the motives and reasons for 
participating in martyrdom, and he legitimates this division within the context ofShi'a 
religious history. He uses two models to define the distinction; first, the Prophet 
Muhammad's uncle Hamzah, who in fought at Uhud and died on the battlefield, second, 
Hussein who, according to Shari'ati, is different from any other because he is 'the 
figurehead ofmartyrs' and defines "existential choice". 
Hamzah, for Shari 'ati, represents a 'hero', one who gives meaning to jihad, the mujahid, 
one who strives against the enemy for victory in the battlefield: 
Hamzah is a mujahid and a hero who goes (into battle) to achieve victory 
and defeat the enemy. Instead, he is defeated, is killed, and thus becomes 
a shahid. But this represents an individual shahadat. His name is 
registered at the top of the list of those who died for the cause of their 
belief. 111 
Hussein, however, for Shari'ati is a pious political rebel who chooses to make the 
ultimate sacrifice for the Shi'a cause: 
Hussein, on the other hand, is a different type. He does not go (into battle 
with the intention of) succeeding in killing the enemy and winning 
victory. Neither is he accidentally killed by a terrorist act of someone 
such as Wahshi (savage) . This is not the case. Hussein , while he could 
11 0 Janet Afary, Shi'i Narratives of Karbala and Christian Rites of Penance: Michel Foucault and th e Culture of:. the Iranian 
Revolution, 1978-1979, http:muse. jhu.edu/joumals/radical history review/v086/86.1 afary.html (cited : 22" March 
2006), p. II 
111 Ali Shari'ati , Jihad and Shahadat, http://www.shatiati .com/, (cited: 20th March 2006) 
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stay at home and continue to live, rebels and consciously welcomes 
death . Precisely at this moment. he chooses self-negation . He takes this 
dangerous route, placing himself in the battlefield, in front of the 
contemplators of the world and in front of time, so that [the consequence 
of] his act might be widely spread and the cause for which he gives his 
life might be realized sooner. Hussein chooses shahadat as an end or as a 
means for the affirmation of what is being negated and mutilated by the 
political apparatus. Conversely, shahadat chooses Hamzah and the other 
mujahidin who go for victory. In the shahadat ofHussein, the goal is self-
negation for the sanctity [of that ideal], which is being negated and 
gradually is vanishing. At this point, jihad and shahadat are completely 
separate from each other. 112 
Thus, he considers Hamzah, a mujahid113 who wanted to defeat the enemy. He was 
prepared to take death as a possible outcome of war but did not seek to die, i.e, 'passive 
combative martyrdom' . Whilst Hussein is a politic rebel, he made the conscious 
decision to sacrifice his life as a tool for political means against injustice and 
oppression. According to Shari'ati, Hussein's model of consciously choosing death over 
earthly life, when he could have continued to live, has much greater religious 
significance than Hamzah's model, or any martyrdom for the sake ofjihad. 114 Shari'ati 
is the first to approach Hussein's martyrdom in such away that it allows for the 
distinction between martyrdom in the context of jihad and martyrdom in the context of 
the political realm. This is a significant shift in the concept of martyrdom, and is 
essentially the basis for the revival of 'active martyrdom', as it allowed from Hussein's 
death to become a model for martyrdom. 
Hussein's martyrdom as political, rather 'combative', allows for 'active martyrdom' to 
be emancipated from the confines of the Shi'a conditions ofjihad. When Hussein's 
martyrdom is within the context of jihad, reinterpretations into the contemporary 
context can only promote Hussein as the ultimate example of revolutionary spirit (as 
Khomeini 's early interpretations). This is because of the Shi'a understanding of the 
112 Ali Shari'ati, Jihad and Shahadat, http://www.shariati .com/, (cited: 20th March 2006) 
11 3 
"Strivers ". Those who stntgglefor th e faith, those who wage jihad. Here is it used in a way that is similar to solider. 
114 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah 's New Martyrs, (London : Pluto Press, 2005), p.43 
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conditions ofjihad. According to Shi'a theology, only the Twelfth hnam has the 
legitimate authority to declare jihad 11 5 and, thus, in the absence ofthe Twelfth hnam 
the conditions in which Hussein's martyrdom occurred cannot be in existence today. 
Therefore, Hussein's martyrdom cannot be imitated. Shari'ati's unique intetpretation of 
Hussein ' s martyrdom, as political, removes it from these restrictions ofthe Shi'a 
conditions of jihad. This represents a significant ideological shift in the concept of 
martyrdom, as it allows for Hussein's martyrdom to be imitated in the contemporary 
situation and provides legitimacy of use of' active political martyrdom'. 
In addition to legitimizing ' active martyrdom' modelled on Hussein, removing 
Hussein's martyrdom fromjihad completely reconstructs the function of martyrdom. 
Martyrdom becomes a death that has a symbolic value rather than a 'combative' value. 
Shari'ati ' s Hussein is individualised, htimanised and revolutionised. This breaks the 
traditional transcendent and infallible nature ofHussien as the hnam. Individualising 
him makes him responsible for his individual conscious decision to be martyred and 
rejects traditional intetpretations of divine intervention and predestination. Humanising 
him places his rebellion solely upon his humanity and conscious reasoning, rejecting 
any innate knowledge. Hussein, as a revolutionary, shifts the understanding of his death 
exclusively into the context of political rebellion, which is more applicable to the 
contemporary situation. Thus, Hussein, based on his own individual conscious decision, 
chose to die a death that was a symbolic sacrifice against the unjust. 
To emphasise this symbolic shift, Shari'ati proposes that martyrdom, imitating the model 
ofHussein , equates to becoming completely religiously good, and subsequently 
11 5 Note: Twelver understanding. 
The 12tl' Imam has been in occultation since 874 . 
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provides a free pass to paradise without judgement. Theologically, human beings are 
made up of earthly body and a divine soul, mortal and divine. Humans, therefore, by 
nature have the possibility to be both good and bad. The purpose of religion is to guide 
the good half to triumph over the bad. However, according to Shari'ati, 'active political 
martyrdom', in the model of Hussein, insures the triumph of the good over the bad: 
Martyrdom is an act whereby a man is suddenly, and in revolutionary 
mode, flings his vile being (the diabolic half) into the frre of love and 
faith and thus becomes completely good. This is why a martyr must not 
be washed in keeping with the Islamic ritual, and why, on Judgement 
Day, he does not have to account for his actions because the sinful and 
guilty man- this was his way of life before he was martyred- was 
sacrificed before he died, and because he is now 'in the presence' 11 6 •.• 
When they are weakened and have no means whereby to struggle, they 
guarantee their lives, movements, faith , respect, honor, future and history 
with martyrdom. Martyrdom is an invitation to all ages and generations: 
"If you can, kill , and if you cannot, die!" 11 7 
The last sentence, '.lfyou can, kill, and ifyou cannot, die!', is essentially the foundation 
for the contemporary use of' active political martyrdom'. Shar'iati reasons that it is 
legitimate to intentionally and consciously control one's death and sacrifice one's life, 
after having reasoned that there is no other conventional alternative available and the 
sacrifice of the life will further the cause oflslam on its symbolic value. This displays 
the crucial distinction between 'active combative martyrdom' and 'active political 
martyrdom'. The 'active combative martyr' is one who chooses to fight to the death. 
The fight is the tool, and the death is the condition. Whereas, the 'active political 
martyr' is the one who chooses to die, rejecting earthly life for death. 118 The choosing 
to die is the tool and the death is the condition. 
In Jihad and Shahadat, Shari'ati states that the affects of martyrdom in the model of 
Hussein: "By his [Hussein's} death, he condemns the oppressor and provides 
116 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah 's New Martyrs, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p.44 
11 7 Ali Shari'ati. Ali Shari'ati, Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witn ess, http://www.shariati.com/, (cited : 20th March 2006) 
118 Note: ' earthly' life, ' earthly' is specified as martyrs are not considered to be dead; they are understood to have eternal 
life in Paradise. 
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commitment for the oppressed. He exposes aggression and revives what has hitherto 
been negated" 119 Thus, in the contemporary situation, "If you can, kill, and if you 
cannot, die!", or 'active political martyrdom' is a legitimate tactic against tyranny and 
oppression. It is this clause that resonated with those who perceived themselves weaker 
politically, and militarily, than their enemy.120 It was in the Iran-Iraq war that this 
sentence transitioned from a philosophy to an 'active' phenomenon. 
Shari'ati's work displays his beliefs that one ofthe greatest and most revolutionary 
contributions oflslam to human society has been to instil a sense of devotion and 
sacrifice in the pursuit of justice. 121 Before the revolution, Shari' ati 's work found 
popularity mostly among the student population, and it was these students that put up 
spectacular protests during the revolution. The real influence of his work was not felt 
until after his death in 1977, in the post- revolution decade. Khomeini adapted 
Shari'ati's ideas into his religio-political scholarship and commissioned mass re-
printings ofhis work. 
Unfortunately, Shari'ati is often overlooked in the literature on 'suicide bombing', and 
the important ideological shifts are not assessed. 122 As a result, to reconcile the martyr's 
of the Iranian Revolution within Shi'ajurisprudence, without an understanding of 
Shari'ati's Hussein, leads to most studies falsely assuming that Khomeini declared 
jihad, which, in tum, results in an understanding of the development ofthe concept of 
'suicide bombing' and the revival of 'active martyrdom' which is out of the context 
119 Ali Shari'ati. Jihad and Shahadat, http ://www.shariati.com/,(cited: 20°' March 2006) 
120 Both Hezbollah and Palestinian groups have utilised this clause to legitimate their use of' active martyrdom' . 
121 Manochehr Dorraj,"Symbolic and Utilitarian Political Value of a Tradition: Martyrdom in the Iranian Political Culture", 
The Review of Politics 59:3 (Summer, 1997): p. 512 
122 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Aflah 's New Martyrs, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), is one of the only studies 
that provides any discussion of Shari 'ati 's philosophies. However, Khosrokhavar sociological and jihad focused 
approach limits the ability to see the true significance ofShari'ati's ideas. 
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from which it occurred. The martyrs ofthe revolution and the Iran-Iraq war are not 
martyrs in the context of jihad, as there is no evidence that Khomeini actuaJly declare 
jihad. The assumption that Khomeini did declare jihad is not completely unfounded, as 
Khomeini did reinterpret the Shi'a conditions ofjihad during the revolution, claiming 
that until the Twelfth Imam returned his authority to declare jihad should be invested in 
the religious leadership. However, he actuaJly never did declare jihad, he only ever said 
that he could legitimately declare jihad, if he needed to. It was on the 19th ofFebruary 
1979 that Khomeini gave this strong warning about jihad to the Shah's regime, basically 
saying that he had the legitimacy to declare jihad, but he had not ordered it yet. He 
ordered the regime to stop killing of the Iranian people immediately or he would have to 
make his final decision about declaringjihad.123 However, on the 20th of February 1979 
the Shah's regime fell. Khomeini never actually had to declare jihad. Furthermore, I 
have also found no evidence that Khomeini declared jihad against Iraq, although 
according to Shi'a tradition, the conditions of the Iran-Iraq war were purely defensive 
and the Twelfth Imam's authority is not need in a defensive jihad. Khomeini could have 
legitimately declared jihad as a defensive measure to protect the boarders oflslam. 
Despite this, there is no evidence that he ever did. 
3:2:4 Iran-Iraq War 
When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in September of 1980, Khomeini resurrected the 
Hussein martyrdom narrative. Khomeini advocated Shari'ati's interpretation of 
Hussein's martyrdom, completing the transition from theory into the reality ofthe 
phenomena of 'active political martyrdom'. With the success ofthe revolution and the 
123 Etteli 'p (Iranian Newspaper) . 19tl' February 1979 : last page, top of the last column. Translation : Negar Partow. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF 
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removal ofthe Shah, the role of'Yazid' was void; Khomeini flawlessly recast the role 
with Saddam Hussein and his western supporters. 124 The application ofthe narrative to 
the war with Iraq, forged a sense of solidarity, encouraged mass mobilisation, defended 
the sacred values ofthe community and legitimated conscious death, with much greater 
potency then the revolutionary years. It is the Iranian youth soldiers that voluntarily 
walked through the Iraqi mine fields to clear a path of the Iranian tanks and military 
divisions that we can assign the full conversion ofKhomeini's and Shari'ati's ideas from 
theory into practice. 125 Systematic and symbolic martyrdom pervaded Iran during the 
war with Iraq, 126 this represents Shari'ati's existentialist individualism, combined with 
an absolute faith in Khomeini's revolutionary leadership. 
Christopher Reuter describes in his book, My Life Is A Weapon, that the 'human waves' 
of Iranian youths, mostly unarmed, would chant "Ya Karbala! Ya Hussein! Ya 
Khomeini!" as they marched towards the Iraq artillery. 127 Furthermore, he describes a 
scene where more than 23,000 Iranian youths from one ofthe 'human wave attacks' all 
lay dead with plastic keys around their necks, which they had been told would open the 
doors to paradise once they had died as martyrs. The chants and the keys of the 
martyred Iranian youths graphically demonstrate the culmination of the political 
reinterpretation ofHussein's death and powerful relio-political discourse. The 
overriding readiness of these youths to march towards their certain deaths clearly 
embodies conscious 'active political martyrdom'. They choose to die, rejecting earthly 
life for symbolic death. The youth martyrs were a successful tactic, not only because it 
124Christoph Reuter, A Modern History of Suicide Bombing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004 ), p. 43 
125 It is in 1980, during the lran- Iraq war, that the first ever 'suicide bombing' associated with Islam technicaU y occurred. 13 
year old Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh threw himself underneath an Irai tank and detonated a bomb. 
126 Manochehr Dorraj, (Summer, 1997), p. 489 
127 Christoph Reuter, A Modern Hist01y of Suicide Bombing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 34-35 
Reuter describes 'Human wave attacks' as "parades of mass self- sacrifice". Christoph Reuter, p. 36 
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caused the Iraqi machine gunners to run out of ammunition because ofthe volume of 
people, but more so they could no longer bear to shoot masses of children the same age 
as their own. This clearly illustrates the definition of 'active political martyrdom' as 
martyrdom in which choosing to die is the tool and the death is the condition. This is the 
individualised martyrdom ideology that provides the martyrological basis for the 
'suicide bomber'. 
3:3 SUNNI REVIVALIST JIHAD 
The Sunni world went through a similar revivalist approach during the 20th century and 
many of the ideas parallel developments occurring within Shi'a discourse, however, 
there are two prominent distinctions: the focus remains firmly grounded within the 
notion ofjihad, and the traditional understanding of martyrdom as 'passive' is retained. 
Three of the most prominent intellectual figures in the early Sunni revivalists scene are 
Sayyid Abu Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Their works can be considered 
the foundation ofSunni revivalist thought and are central to the contemporary 
interpretations of the concepts ofrevivalistjihad and provide a suitable foundation for 
the later appropriation of the Shi 'a model of' active political martyrdom' back into the 
context ofjihad. 
Sunni revivalist thought is a diverse area of scholarship . I will be focusing on several 
key shifts in the notion ofjihad that complemented the shifts in Shi'a thought on 'active 
political martyrdom'. The key shifts in the Sunni notion ofjihad are displayed in the 
influential works ofMawdudi (1903-1979), founder ofJama' at I Islami in Pakistan, 
Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) ofthe Egyptian Muslim 
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Brotherhood. Mawdudi 's works reflects a strong political-religious position. He shifts 
the focus ofjihad away from the foreign and external forces, and reflects it inwards 
towards local 'tyrannical' government authorities . The second shift can be seen in the 
theories ofHasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Al-Banna 
rejected the traditional held two-fold notion of jihad, and placed primary emphasis on 
the external physicaljihad. Finally, Sayyid Qutb, ofthe Egyptian Brotherhood, who was 
heavily influenced by the former scholars' notions, advocated a form of active 
individual military jihad. Qutb's work is perhaps most important in terms of its 
ideological influence on contemporary Islamist groups. He is considered to be one of 
the most important scholars of the twentieth century by some Palestinian groups . Qutb 
created an ideological basis for jihad for the individual and focused against the 
'oppressive' enemy, this provides the complementary ideological basis the 
appropriation of' active political martyrdom'. 
3:3:1 Mawdudi and Jihad against the Central Authority 
The contemporary movement to redefine jihad was led by Mawdudi. In his work 
Mawdudi focused on the thesis that present-day Muslim societies are going through a 
new era ofjahiliyya (ignorance), despite being ruled by Muslim rulers. 128 Jahiliyya 's 
original meaning refers to the Muslim understanding of the state of ignorance in the pre-
Islamic period, which was characterised by idolatry. For Mawdudi, this state can recur 
at any time when the society strays from the true understanding oflslam. When a state 
ofjahiliyya has occurred and inhibits Muslims from the true God or the true Islam, it is 
128Earlier theoreticians such as Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Kathir focus on this subject. Noor Mohammad, "The Doctrine of 
Jihad: An Introduction", Journal of Law and Religion 3:2 (1985): p.394, see, Abu Mawdudi, The Meaning of th e Quran, 
http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online library/tafsir/chapter introduction of Quran Maududi/index.htrn, (cited: 17th 
August 2006) Jahiliyya, is a Qur'anic term that refers to the era of pre-Islamic ignorance in Arabia. Mawdudi's and 
Qutb's revivalist notion ofjahiliyya transforms the term from a specific historical period of time, into a 'condition'. Pre-
Islamicjahillyya is simple ignorance; modernjahiliyya is conscious arrogation of God' s authority. Roxanne Euben, 
"Killing (For) Politics", Journal of Political Theory 30:1 (February 2002): p.15 
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then necessary to declare j ihad to eliminate it. This idea of the present condition of 
jahiliyya was a central issue for Qutb and has become one of the driving forces behind 
revivalist jihad and a central theme in Islamist political writing of Sunni revivalists in 
the twentieth century. 
Mawdudi's understanding of the Muslim world being in a state ofjahiliyya represents a 
radical reshaping of the scope and practice ofjihad for the Sunni tradition. It turned the 
focus of the direction ofjihad inwards, towards Muslim society and govemment. 129 
With a strong politico-religious approach, Mawdudi saw jihad as a revolutionary too1. 130 
This direction of jihad that was counter to the traditional Sunni quietist approach to the 
central authority, which asserted acceptance ofleadership whether corrupt or not as long 
as they were identified as Muslim. Mawdudi asserts that in the current world conditions 
jihad is not ordinary warfare but social revolution, 131 a struggle to transform society and 
eliminate all aspects that prevent obedience to God. He understood jihad as a non-
violent gradual political process. He considered the current form of nationalism to be 
completely devoid of God and an institutionalised form of Godlessness. He claimed that 
traditional Islam has respect for the fundamentals , the five pillars of the faith, and jihad. 
This reinterpreted and politicisedjihad is the primary necessity for Mawdudi and he 
understood it to a dominant fundamental principle, the sixth pillar oflslam. 132 Thus it is 
a duty to declare and wage jihad against anyone or anything that has or will infringe 
upon God ' s power and sovereignty. For Mawdudi's construction ofjihad, a tyrannical or 
impious Muslim government is just as much a legitimate focus of jihad as a colonial 
129 Roxanne Euben, "Jihad and Politica l V iolence", Current History: Journal of Contemporary World Affairs (November 
2002): p . 369 
130 David Zeidan, "Fundamentalist View of Li fe as a Perennial Battle", Middle East Review of International Affairs 5:4 
(December 200 I): p. 4 
131 The soc ial revolutionary function of j ihad was historicall y more sui ted to Shi 'a thought. 
132 Traditionall y there are considered to be 5= fi ve pillars of Is lam. Shahadah, profession of faith . Salah, praryer fi ve times a 
day. Sawn, fas ting during Ramamdan. Zakat, giving charity. Ha;j , pilgrimage to Mecca. 
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oppressor, because jihad is the struggle for Islamic social revolution, the enemy is both 
inside and outside. 133 
Shifting the focus inwards, towards Muslim governments allowed Mawdudi to assert an 
individual relationship with jihad. In accordance with classical Sunni understanding of 
jihad,jihad is a collective duty when the enemy is external, however, if the enemy 
invades or occupies Muslim lands the duty of jihad becomes incumbent upon each 
individual. It is the individual duty of every Muslim to participate in the jihad required 
to liberate Muslim land. 134 Mawdudi's understanding ofthejahiliyya condition present 
in the colonial/post-colonial Muslim world, in which corrupt Muslim leaders are aiding 
and abetting Westerners, represents an invasion and, therefore, individualised jihad is a 
necessity to return the society to true Islam. Mawdudi did not, however, advocate an 
armed or violent from of jihad, and thus the notion of martyrdom is not prominent in his 
discourse. Mawdudi saw education, rather than violence, as key to bettering the Muslim 
world, 'the society must be Islamised before the true state can apply' .135 
Mawdudi's ideas are more closely aligned to a Shi'a approach of critiquing the central 
authority than the traditional Sunni quietist approach to authority. His work is similar to 
understandings oftyranny and oppression in the Shi'a scholarship coming out ofNajaf 
and Iran in the 1960's and 1970's. Like Shari'ati, Mawdudi's work places an emphasis 
on the role of the individual and he borrows heavily from western leftist schools of 
thought. 
133 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah 's New Martyrs, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p.57 . This inward shift of 
jihad towards corrupt Muslim authority is not of primary importance to the adaptation of 'active martyrdom' , as by the 
1970-80 Sunni revivalist generally shift the focus of jihad back towards the external, foreign' infidel '. However, the 
inward shift is a stepping-stone in the shaping of revivali st jihad, it created the emphasises on the ' individual ', which are 
key foundations to the adoption process of'active martyrdom' . 
134 Margaret Cormack ( ed.) , Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001 ), p. 112 
135 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p.57 
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3:3:2 Al-Banna, the Rejection ofthe Two-Fold Notion of Jihad and the Revival of 
Martyrdom 
Hasan Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 as a reaction to 
Western imperialism. Like Mawdudi, Al-Banna sought to return the Muslim world to 
'true Islam' throughjihad. For Al-Banna, it was the revival ofthe importance ofthe 
physical jihad and martyrdom that was necessary for the success of the Muslim 
community and the return of 'true Islam'. 136 AI- Banna rejected the two-fold notion of 
jihad, the 'greater jihad' (jihad a! akbar) and the 'lesser jihad' (jihad a! asgar), 137 
claiming the traditions on which the distinction oflesser and greater jihad are made are 
unreliable and developed to try and divert Muslims from the importance of waging 
physicaljihad. 138 Al-Banna asserted that those who have faith in the traditions of 
internal spiritual jihad and minimise the importance of external physical jihad are not 
true to the Islamic faith. For Al-Banna it was entirely on the ability and willingness of 
Muslims to carry out physical jihad that the future and success of the umma depended 
on.
139 Initially, like Mawdudi, Al-Banna did not advocate violence; he envisioned 
change through gradual social reformation, as a result vehemently carrying out 'true' 
jihad, by means of protest, scholarship, education and welfare. 140 
136 Translations of al-Banna 's work are available at http: //www .youngmuslims.ca .Hasan Al-Banna, Jihad, 
http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online library/books/jihad/index .htm, (cited: 22nd August 2006) 
137 See chapter one. 
138 Margaret Cormack ( ed.), Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion , (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 200 I), p. Ill and David Zeidan, "Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle", Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 5:4 (December 200 I): p. 16 
139 Margaret Cormack (ed.) , (200 I), p. Ill . The rejection of the internal jihad, is not an outright rejection, it is more so that 
they can not be separated out, one is incorporated in the other and visa versa. 
140 It was not until World War II that the Muslim Brotherhood, under ai-Banna, added a military arm to their organisation. 
Are Knudsen, "Crescent and Sword: The Hamas Enigma", Th e Third World Quarterly 26:8 (2005): p. l375 and, 
Youaaef Aboui-Enien, "Al-Ikhwan AI-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood", Military Review (July-August 2003): p. 
28 
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In keeping with traditional understandings oflesser jihad, Al-Banna saw jihad as a 
defensive strategy only. A defensive jihad traditionally requires a communal obligation; 
however, for Al-Banna, the post-colonial central authority was corrupt and controlled 
by unbelievers, thus Al-Banna stressed the necessity for individual responsibility: 
"It has become an individual obligation, which there is no evading, on 
every Muslim to prepare his equipment, to make his mind to engage in 
jihad, and to get ready for it until the opportunity is ripe and God 
decrees a matter which is sure to be accomplished."14 
As Al-Banna'sjihad became a concrete physical notion; martyrdom as a feature of 
jihad underwent the same process. If the only 'true' jihad is physical struggle, then the 
only true martyrs are those who die in that 'true' struggle. 142 He emphasised the 
individual duty of jihad and, consequently, the individual duty to be prepared to die a 
martyr for this jihad. The success of the Muslim community depends onjihad and the 
success of jihad depends on the willingness to die. Similar to revolutionary Shi'a 
thought, Al-Banna recognised the use ofheroic death as a 'political art-form': 143 
"Brothers! God gives the ununa that is skilled in the practice of death and 
that knows how to die a noble death an exalted life in this world and 
eternal felicity in the next. What is the fantasy that has reduced us to 
loving this world and hating death? If you gird yourselves for a lofty deed 
and yearn for death, life shall be given to you ... Know, then, that death is 
inevitable, and that it can only happen once. If you suffer in the way of 
God, it will profit you in this world and bring you reward in the next." 144 
Al-Banna asserted that since all must die, we should prepare to die in a way that will 
make a difference to the cause oflslam. He emphasised the rewards of martyrdom by 
referring to the same Qur'anic verse that the Kharijites emphasised and named 
themselves after, 'Let those (believers) who sell the life of this worldfor the Hereafter 
141 Hasan AI-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949): A Selection from the Majmu 'a t Rasa 'if al-Imam al-
Shahid. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 150-151. Accessed in: David Zeidan, "Fundamentalist View 
of Life as a Perennial Battle", Middle East Review of international Affairs 5:4 (December 2001 ): p . 4 
142 Cormack, Margaret (ed.), (2001) p. 112. The 'passive accidental' categories of martyrdom are not rejected entirely by the 
at- Hanna's revivalist model, those who die of the plague or during childbirth are still considered to be martyrs but a 
different and much lesser category of martyr. 
143 Laden Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, "Terror, Islam and Democracy", Journal of Democracy 13 :2 (April2002): p. 
7-8 
144 Hasan Al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan AI-Banna (1906-1949): A Selection from the Majmu 'at Rasa 'if al-Imam al-
Shahid. (Berkley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1978), p . 156. 
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fight in the cause of Allah., and whosoever fights in the Cause of Allah, and is killed or is 
victorious, We shall bestow on him a great reward. '(Q 4:74). His understanding of 
martyrdom is as an exchange oflife for the Islamic cause for which one needs to be 
rewarded. 145 In accordance ofhis narrowing of the notion ofjihad, Al-Banna declared 
that the ultimate true and supreme reward of martyrdom is reserved exclusively for those 
who are killed in the way of God through a physical fightingjihad. 146 
Martyrdom in Al-Banna's work is an individual and conscious acceptance ofthe 
willingness to sacrifice yourself and die for jihad. The element of consciousness places 
this form of martyrdom on the cusp between 'passive' and 'active' martyrdom. It is not 
'active martyrdom', as there is only an acceptance of martyrdom as a 'willingness, not a 
'determination' for death. 
3 :3 :3 Sayyid Qutb 
After Al-Banna was executed by the Egyptian Government in 1949, 147 Sayyid Qutb took 
over leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. 148 Qutb draws together the ideas of 
Mawdudi's social revolution againstjahiliyya and Al-Banna's physicaljihad and 
145 Hasan Al-Banna, Jihad, http: //www .youngmusl ims.ca/online library/books/jihad/index .htm (cited: 22nd August 2006) 
Margaret Cormack (ed.), (2001), pp. 107-117. Parallels AI-Banna's use of the Qur'anic verse 4:74 to the Kharijites. Brown 
makes an interesting connection about the dual emphasis of the verse, while the comparison is important; there are some 
significant differences. The Kharijites understood this verse to justifYing ' active martyrdom' , whereas ai-Banna does not 
read activism into the verse, it is a preparedness to martyr and if that were to happen, it would be a noble way to die. 
146 Margaret Cormack ( ed.), (200 1 ), p. 112 
147 Incidentally, execution of the prominent clerics/intellectuals/leaders that write about the concept of martyrdom has 
occurred regularly for both Sunni and Shi'ite in the 20th century. This meant that they became martyrs themselves, some 
zealously, others accidentally. Frequently this was at the hands of their own government, which feeds back and 
legitimised their ideologies and their cause. AI-Banna was assassinated in 1949. The Egyptian Government executed 
Sayyid Qutb in 1956. The Iraqi Government executed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in 1980. Ali Shari'ati , although he 
reportedly died of a heart attack, much speculation surrounds his death, and according to his official website he was 
'martyred' three weeks after he moved to London in 1977 by the SA V AK (Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar, the 
security and intelligence service of Iran). 
148 For more detailed information of Sayyid Qutb's life and his work see Luke Loboda, Th e Thought ofSayyid Qutb, 
http://www.ashbrook.org/tools/printeroage.asp, (cited: I Oth August 2006). An English translation of Milestones is 
available onJine at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_ library/books/milestones/hold/index_2.asp 
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willingness for martyrdom, to promote a militant, political, activist form of Islam. 149 
Qutb's work has been highly influential in the contemporary Islamist world. His work 
had a huge effect on creating a complementary basis of jihad and individualism for which 
'active martyrdom' was able to be appropriated with in. 
Like Mawdudi, Qutb identified the condition ofjahiliyya as plaguing the Muslim world 
and as preventing true Islam from flourishing. 150 Similarly to the way in which the Shi'a 
clerics in Najafutilised the narrative ofHussein in the contemporary context, Qutb made 
an analogy with the Qur'anic references to the Pharaoh, who is considered to be 
'arrogant' and 'insolent' and 'in the land without reason', to reinforce the concept of 
jahiliyya in the contemporary context. Qutb asserted that the rule of the Pharaoh displays 
a tyranny that parallels the contemporary Egyptian Government. Referring to the 
Qur'anic story ofMoses' confrontation with Pharaoh, Qutb reinforced his call for jihad 
by suggesting that it is the aggressive and courageous confrontation oftyrants who 
control God's land that is exactly what is necessary today. 151 
Like Al-Banna, Qutb emphasised the external physical jihad, however, Qutb understood 
it to be political, aggressive, and militant. 152 He challenged the majority view ofSunni 
149 For Qutb the three main sources ofjahiliyya are the 'Crusading Christian West, Marxist Communism, and World Jewry' , 
they are considered to be the enemies of God and continuously plotting the destruction oflslam. David Zeidan, 
"Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle", Middle East Review of International Affairs 5:4 (December 200 I): 
p.9 
150 In Qutb's later writings he asserts that the condition ofjahiliyya has been so since 661 C.E, except for a 3 year period 
during the rule of'Umar II from 717 to 720. Shahrough Akhavi, "The Dialectiv In Contemporary Egyptian Social 
Thought", International Journal of Middle East Studies 29:3 (August 1997): p.381 
151 Sayyid Qutb. 'This is the Road' . Milestones. (Online: 
http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online library/books/milestones/hold/index 2.asp) and Dale. F Eickelman, and James 
Piscatori, Muslim Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 65. This analogy between Qur'anic 
Pharaonic rule and the contemporary Egyptian Government resonated within Islamic activist groups. The assassins of 
Sadat made this connection: "I am Khalid Islambuli : I killed the Pharaoh, and I am not afraid of death." Eickelman, and 
James Piscatori , (1996), p. 66 
152 His understanding of jihad is not restricted to the political or militant realm, Like al-Banna, the rejection of the two-fold 
notion is not out right rejection . Physica l jihad issues, like politics and militancy, also have a spiritual component, they 
cannot be separated . One must wage external physical jihad for the sake of internal sp irit. Luke Loboda, The Thought of 
62 
ulema of the time and their understanding of external jihad as a collective defensive 
measure and asserted that jihad is an offensive 'active' personal obligation. For Qutb, 
jihad is the method of eradicatingjahiliyah and establishing God's authority on earth 
and, therefore, cannot be restricted to the defensive notion. 153 Qutb had a pan-Islamic 
approach to jihad and saw it as a universal tool for freedom, because all human beings 
deserve to be free from the oppression ofjahiliyya. His understanding of jihad is not a 
regionally specific solution, as God it is not restricted by country, sex, race, or religion. 
Western civilisation is suffering from the condition ofjahiliyya in the same way as 
Muslims, and once they are exposed to 'true' Islamic society they will be drawn to it: 154 
"It[Islam] addresses itself to the whole of mankind, and its sphere of 
work is the whole earth . God is the Sustainer not merely of the Arabs, nor 
is His providence limited to those who believe in the faith of Islam. God 
is the Sustainer of the whole world." 155 
Qutb claims that jihad should only be directed against institutions and organisations, and 
not individuals. Institutions and organisations createjahiliyya, not the individuals under 
them. It is the individual obligation of every Muslim to wage jihad in order to free 
humans from the institutions and organisations that create jahiliyya. 156 Qutb vehemently 
condemned all Muslims who refused to individually accept the duty to wage jihad in 
such circumstances. 157 Relying on justification from the Qur'anic verse 4:76, 158 Qutb, 
reasoned that all Muslims who are able should continuously wage jihad and that any 
individual who considers him or herself Muslim, but fails to do so, is not a true believer. 
Sayyid Qutb, http://www.ashbrook.org/tools/printerpage.asp, (cited : lOth August 2006), p.l8 
153 The first target ofQutb'sjihad was the ruling elite of Egypt, starting with Nasser. His book Milestones (1964) was 
considered to be a direct threat to Nasser's government, resulting in his arrest in August of 1965. Qutb was sentenced to 
death and hanged in August of 1966. Luke Laboda, (2006), p.2 . Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah 's New 
Martyrs, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), pp. 30,44 
1s4 Luke Loboda, (2006), p.l9 
tss Sayyid Qutb, "Jihad in the Cause of God "', Milestones, 
http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online Library/books/milestones/ho ld/index 2.asp (cited: I Oth August, 2006) 
1
s6 Luke Laboda, (2006), p. 20 
1s7Bemard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law ofWar: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
Law Jouma/27 (December 2003 ): p. 349 
tss Those who believe fight in th e cause of Allah, and those who reject Faith Fight in the cause of Evil: So fight ye against 
th e friends ofSatan:feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan.- Yusuf Ali 4 :76 
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Consequently, a Muslims willingness to engage in physical and militant jihad is the true 
test of faith. Qutb 'sjihad is 'active'; he completely rejects the 'passive', equating it with 
the ungodly. It is from within this framework of jihad that Qutb stressed the importance 
and the virtues of martyrdom. 
If it is every individual Muslim's obligation to engage in 'active ' jihad, then, Qutb 
argued, it is every individual Muslim's obligation to be willing to die forjihad, if death 
were required for the way of victory oflslam. Strikingly similar to Shari'ati's 
understanding of the role of martyrdom, for Qutb, the willingness to sacrifice oneself is 
"The Way" to the victory oflslam. Martyrs are the milestones on the path to liberation. 
Furthermore, because Qutb'sjihad is politically framed and he asserted an individual 
conscious connection to the duty ofjihad, there are parallels to Shari ' ati 's notion of 
individual political consciousness. 
Many western scholars directly attribute Qutb 's ideas to modem 'active martyrdom' in 
the form of 'suicide bombing' . Although his work has had a significant influence on the 
understanding oflslam,jihad and martyrdom, it should be noted that Qutb never actually 
suggested or advocated ' active martyrdom' .159 He asserted one should be prepared and 
willing to be martyred in jihad but not to engage in jihad with the determination to die 
and seek martyrdom. Qutb 's understanding still remains on the 'passive ' side of the 
martyrdom spectrum. However, because of the heightened 'active' understanding of 
jihad, the emphasis on the role of the individual consciousness, and the preparedness for 
martyrdom, his conditions ofjihad challenge the boundaries of the traditional 
understanding of martyrdom. The condition ofthe individual is similar to the Shi 'a 
159 Bemard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Is lamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
Law Journa/ 27 (December 2003 ): p. 350 
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revolutionary understanding that was the foundation of allowing for the possibility of 
'active political martyrdom' to transform into 'suicide bombing'. 
3:4 CONCLUSION 
The 20th century witnessed the development of revivalist movements within Sunni and 
Shi'a discourse as a response to post-colonialism and increasing Western influence in 
the Middle East. Both the revivalist Shi'ite scholars ofNajaf, Iraq and Qom, Iran, and 
the revivalist Sunni scholars ofJama'at I Islami in Pakistan, Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, saw an 'individual approach' as the answer; the Shi'ite scholars within the 
context of martyrdom and the Sunni scholars within the context ofjihad. 160 
The dominant theme ofShi'ite revivalist scholars in the 1960's and 1970's, lead by 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Muhammad al-Sadr, Ayatollah Talequani and Ali Shari'ati, was 
the re-interpretation ofthe traditional narrative ofHussien's martyrdom into the 
political context to inspire revolutionary activism. However, it is the works of Shari' ati, 
who divorces Hussein's martyrdom fromjihad, that creates the important ideological 
shifts that allow for Hussein martyrdom to become a model of symbolic martyrdom that 
was able to be imitated. Khomeini utilized Shari'ati's martyrdom ideologies during the 
post-Revolutionary war with Iraq, casting Saddam Hussein and his western supporters 
as the 'oppressors' and the Iranian Shi'a youths as Hussein. From Shari'ati's "Ifyou 
160 The parallel in the 'individual' shift suggests that the emergence ofthe Islamic 'suicide bomber' could be seen as one 
form of an attempt to reconcile traditional Islamic concepts articulation within modernity. It required an individualization of 
the concept of martyrdom and an individualization of the notion of jihad. The process of individualization is seen by the 
ideas ofShari'ati on martyrdom and Qutb onjihad. Shari'ati's individualized construction of martyrdom required a 
reinterpretation of the historical narrative of Hussein into the contemporary political situation. It calls for the waking of 
individual political consciousness , in which each individual will realize that they must choose to sacrifice their Li ves for a 
cause that is greater than life itself. Qutb's individualized understanding of jihad required a reinterpretation of the Qur'anic 
concept ofjahiliyya into the contemporary situation facing the Muslim world . The current state ofjahiliyya plaguing the 
world calls for every individual Muslim to realise the need to wage an aggressive jihad. This reflects an attempt to reconcile 
traditional Islam concepts with modernity and an attempt to establish Islam 's place against the west in the modem world. 
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can, kill and, if you cannot, die!" philosophy, Khomeini created a phenomenon of 
'active political martyrdom' out ofthe Iranian youth that voluntarily walked through the 
Iraqi mine fields to clear a path of the Iranian tanks and military divisions. The 'active 
political martyr' provides the foundation for the construction of the concept of 
martyrdom in the 'suicide bomber'. 
The dominant theme ofSunni revivalist scholars in the early to middle 20th century, led 
by Sayyid Abu Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, was the individualised duty 
of jihad and a revitalisation of the importance of a willingness to sacrifice the 
maximum, including your life, for jihad. The influential works ofQutb had a pan-
Islamic approach, declaring jihad the universal tool to free the world from oppression 
due to jahiliyya. He asserted an 'active' form of jihad, of which it was every individual 
Muslims' obligation to be willing to die for, if death was required in the way of victory 
for Islam. 
The revivalist Shi'a developments on the concept of martyrdom allowed for the martyr 
to choose to die; however, it never permitted the killing, as jihad was not available at 
that time. On the other hand, the revivalist Sunni developments of the notion of jihad, 
allowed for the aggressive waging of jihad in which one could kill ; however, it never 
permitted actively choosing to die, as that would be suicide. This demonstrates that 
'suicide bombing' as a form of martyrdom is not a simple development out of either the 
Sunni or the Shi 'ite jurisprudential traditions. However, there are ideological parallels in 
the role of the individual and the construction of the enemy as the 'oppressor' that 
would allow for a complementary basis for the new Shi 'a martyrdom to be reinterpreted 
into Sunnijihad. Thus, creating the 'suicide bomber' , who can actively choose to die 
while killing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ISLAMIC 'SUICIDE BOMBER' 
4:1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter put f01ward an account of the theoretical developments in the 
concept of martyrdom and jihad in Sunni and Shi'a revivalist thought. These illustrate 
that although the 'suicide bomber' as a form of martyrdom was not a simple 
development for either tradition, there were complementary ideological factors that 
would allow for the possible development of the 'suicide bomber' martyr. The 
development of the 'suicide bomber' required a reinterpretation of the revivalist Shi 'a 
martyrdom into the revivalist Sunnijihad. This chapter will essentially illustrate the 
merging ofthese constructions of martyrdom and jihad and the conversion from theory 
to reality for both Shi' a and Sunni groups. Furthermore, this chapter will argue that it is 
'suicide bombings' martyrological origins within Shi'a 'active political martyrdom' that 
is essential to its continual modification as a 'terrorist' tactic. 
4:2 LEBANON AND INTRODUCTION OF 'SUICIDE BOMBING' 
On October 23rct, 1983, the Islamic 'suicide bomber' was born, when two Shi'ite youths 
connected to the Shi'a group Hezbollah crashed two trucks packed with more than 
2,250kg of explosives into the French and United States Marine barracks in Beirut, 
Lebanon. 161 More than 300 military men and women died. The martyrdoms of the two 
161 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p.166 
There were two other incidents prior to this; December 1981 , during Lebanon's civil war, a car bomb exploded outside 
the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, the Islamic Dawa Party is suspected to have been responsible. April181h 1983 , there was a 
suspected tmck bombing on the United States Embassy, which kill ed 63 people. The conditions surrounding this 
incident are unclear; however, the group Islamic Jihad (the precursor or alter-ego of Hezbollah) claimed responsibility 
for the attack. Because specifics of these attacks are unclear, the HezboUah bombings of October 23'd are commonly 
understood as the beginning of the Islamic 'suicide bombing ' phenomenon. 
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Shi'ite youths were highly successful and resulted in a string of similar attacks . The use 
of 'suicide bombing' as a tactic ultimately lead to the withdrawal of the French and 
United States military from Lebanon and caused the Israeli army to decrease its area of 
occupation. 
These attacks display the reality of the reinterpretation ofShi'a ' active political 
martyrdom ' ideologies within a revivalist understanding of notion ofjihad. For the 
Lebanese situation, there is one Shi'a scholar that deserves attention, Sheikh Fadlullah, 
the spiritual guide ofHezbollah. 162 It is Fadlullah ' s pronouncements on martyrdom that 
not only support the use of 'suicide bombing' by Hezbollah, but, furthermore, his stance 
is foundational in opening up the possibility ofthe appropriation of 'suicide bombing' 
by Sunni Palestinian groups. 
4:2:1 Fadlullah and Hezbollah 
Fadlullah was born in 1935 163 in Najaf, Iraq, into a poor, but prominent Lebanese Shi'ite 
clerical family . He went into religious scholarship, studying under many of the 
prominent Shi'ite scholars of the time in Najaf; and he was a young contemporary of 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.164 Fadlullah's moved to Lebanon in 1966, shortly after 
Khomeini settled in Najaf. His move was well timed and he escaped the chaos that was 
soon to occur in Iran and Iraq. Once in Lebanon, he quickly established himself in 
politics and worked under the Lebanese Imam Musa al-Sadr, helping to establish the 
Lebanese Higher Islamic Supreme Shi'ite Council. Fadlullah's most notable 
162 See, Fadlullah's Offic ial website, "BA YYNAT: The website of religious authority Sayyed Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlu/lah ", http://english.bayynat.org. lb/ (cited: 15th September 2006) 
163 His date of birth is referenced as both 1935 and 1936 depending on the source. The Concise Encyc lopaedia Britannica, 
htto://concise.bri tannica.com/ebc/articl e-9364149/Muhammad-Hussein-Fadlullah places his birth in 193 5. 
164 Grand Ayato llah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was born in 1936 in Kadimi ya, Iraq. He was a highl y influential scholar in 
Najaf 
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achievement is his role in the establishment of Hezbollah. 165 Much ofFadlullah 's 
juristic ideology for Hezbollah are the result of the influence ofKhomeini and Baqir al-
Sadr. 
Fadlullahs works show a shift from the traditional Shi 'a jurisprudential tradition and 
calls for a new military jihad, with 'active martyrdom' as one of it's central tenets. 166 
The role ofFadlullah'sjihad was multi-faceted with both a Lebanese Shi'ite and a 
universal pan-Islamic function. Fadlullah saw jihad as a means to free Lebanese Shi'ites 
form tyranny and oppression. However, Fadlullah also envisioned a universal function 
of jihad, similar to the Qutbian understanding of the notion. He advocated that a pan-
Islamic, military jihad is required to transform the Islamic world, and ultimately the 
entire western world to 'true' Islam.167 Fadlullah addressed his message to all Muslims 
and all oppressed people who suffer from tyrannical authority or injustice. Fadlullah's 
visions are not confined to the limits of nationalism or Shi'ism. It is within this universal, 
pan-Islamic context of military jihad that Fadlullah firmly places his understanding of 
'active martyrdom'. 168 
Fadlullah is heavily influenced by the Iranian revolutionary martyrs and borrows from 
Shar'iati's 'If you can, kill, and if you cannot, die!'. However instead of understanding it 
165 Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
Law Journa/21 (December 2003 ): p. 354. Fadlullah's role in the establishment ofHezbollah is controversial. Saad-
Ghorayeb, Hizbu 'llah : Politics and Religion, (London: Pluto Press, 200 I), believes that Fadlullah was not overly 
instrumental in the establishment ofHezbollah, suggesting that he is a strong source of inspiration rather than a spiritual 
mentor for the party. This was because of his strong popular following that required him to maintain an independence 
from any political party. Hala Jaber, Hizbu'llah, (London: Fourth Estate, 1997) shares this view ofFadlullahs' role. 
166 Note that Fadlullah never glorified 'active martyrdom' or advocated blowing oneself up before 1983 . Before the 1983 
suicide bombings his position on 'active martyrdom' was one of acceptance of its virtue and its tactical advantage, it was 
not until after the 1983 suicide bombings that he really clarified hi s position (discussed above) on the use of'active 
martyrdom '. 
167 B d emar K. Freamon, (December 2003): p. 354 
168 For more information on Fadlullahs pan-Is lamic and ecumenical approach see Martin Kramer's article "The Oracle of 
HizbuUah: Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlalllah". In R. Scott Appleby, Spokemenfor the Despised: Fundamentalist 
Leaders of th e Middle East, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) 
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as martyrdom modelled on the nan·ative ofHussein, as it was in the Iranian situation, 
Fadlullah re-jihadises it within his pan-Islamic notion of jihad. By rejihadising, and not 
relying on the narrative ofHussien for historicallegitimisation, Fadlullah needed to 
reconcile jihad with 'active martyrdom' , he did so by militarizing Shari'ati's weapon of 
the weak philosophy and his 'good' out ways the 'bad clause': 
"When a conflict breaks out between oppressed nations and 
imperialism, or between two hostile governments, the parties to the 
conflict seek ways to complete the elements of their power and to 
neutralize the weapons used by the other side. For example, the 
oppressed nations do not have the technology and destructive weapons 
America and Europe have. They must thus fight with special means of 
their own. [We] recognize the right of nations to use every 
unconventional method to fight these aggressor nations, and do not 
regard what oppressed Muslims of the world do with primitive and 
unconventional means to confront aggressor powers as terrorism. We 
view this as religiously lawful warfare against the world's imperialist 
and domineering powers."169 
If the aim of a Muslim's 'active martyrdom' is "to have a political impact on an enemy 
whom it is impossible to fight by conventional means, then his sacrifice can be part of a 
jihad ", because "naturally, there is a positive aspect and a negative aspect to every 
event in the world," .170 The positive (negatively impacting the enemy) would out weigh 
the negative (both the declaration ofjihad and 'active martyrdom'). The intentions of the 
'active martyr' would be sincere because they further the cause of God in the only 
available way. 
Thus, for Fadlullah, in a circumstance where it is impossible to fight by conventional 
means, the only difference between the early battlefield martyr that storms into battle, 
with a knife, kills and then gets killed and the martyr that straps a bomb to his waist and 
covertly infiltrates the enemy zone and denotes the bomb, kills while being killed, is the 
timing and the technology. Most importantly, he asserts that in the eyes of God there is 
169 Interview with Fadlallah, Kayhan , 14 November 1985 ; accessed in Martin Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizbollah, 
http://www.geocities.com/maJ1inkramerorg/Morall.ogic.htm#n30 , (cited 17°' August 2006) 
170 Ibid 
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no difference between the two: 
"What is the difference between setting out for battle knowing you will die after 
killing ten [of the enemy] , and setting out to the field to kill ten and knowing 
you will die while killing them? There is no difference between dying with a 
gun in your hand or exploding yourself." 171 
Although the Iranian ' active political martyr ' and the new 'suicide bomber' are based on 
Shari 'ati's weapon of the weak, 'If you can, kill and, if you cannot, die ', thejihadization 
creates one crucial difference between them. Shari' ati ' s original version that was 
divorced from jihad only legitimated the death ofthe martyr, the weapon was in the 
symbolic value ofthe readiness to be sacrificed. However, in Fadlullah's version of 
'active martyrdom' as the weapon of the weak, the weapon is twofold. Thejihadization 
allows for enemy causalities, but simultaneously it allows for the martyrdom to maintain 
its symbolic value against the 'oppressor' . His conscious readiness to sacrifice himself 
against the 'oppressor', means " ... he condemns the oppressor and provides commitment 
for the oppressed. "172 Thus, 'If you can, kill, and if you cannot, die!' becomes, ifyou 
can, kill and if you cannot, die while killing' .173 
4:2:2 Fadlullah ' s Jihad and Palestine 
As part ofFadlullah 's universal vision ofjihad, he adopted a particularly anti-Western 
and anti-Israel stance, understanding the West and Israel to be the primary enemy, not 
only of Lebanese Shi ' ites, but of the Islamic world. He placed the Palestinian situation 
as the primary example ofWestem influence and destruction in the Islamic world and 
declared Palestine a central problem in his vision of the Islamic world. Fadlullah draws 
171 Quoted in Martin Kramer, Su icide Terrorism: Origins and Response, 
http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/PapeKramer.htm, (c ited: 12tl' Jul y 2006) 
172 Ali Shari'ati , Jihad and Shahadat, http ://www.shariati .com/, (cited: 20th March 2006) 
173 I would categorize the 'suicide bomber' as 'acti ve politio-combative ma1tyrdom ' 
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comparisons between the displaced Shi'ites in the refugee camps in Beirut and the 
Palestinian people. Fadlullah understood the plights ofboth the Lebanese Shi' ites and 
Palestinian Sunnis as identical via the hands of a common enemy oflslam. This 
comparison was popular among the Palestinian Sunnis and Lebanese Shi'ites, it 
galvanized both communities by feeding off the common enemy and opened up an 
avenue for communication of ideologies. 
Fadlullah's reinterpretation ofShi ' a 'active martyrdom' into his universal, military 
notion of jihad gave Hezbollah the religious support to carry out a string ofhighly 
successful 'suicide bombing' attacks against foreign military targets. 174 With the 
military success of the tactic against the common enemy of both Lebanon and Palestine, 
coupled with Fadlullah 's particularly pan-Islamic approach to jihad and sympathy for 
the Palestinian struggle, it was only a matter of time before this tactic of 'active 
martyrdom' was adopted in Palestine. On April 16th, 1993 , at a roadside cafe at Mehola 
Junction in the northern Jordan Valley, Tamam Nabulsi, a Palestinian connected with 
the Sunni group Hamas drove a van into a parked Israeli bus and detonated it, killing 
two passengers and injuring five others.175 
It could be argued that it was the result ofFadlullah's interpretation of 'active political 
martyrdom' into the contextjihad, and consequently Hezbollah 's successful use of the 
tactic , that lead to the possibility ofthe adoption of ' active martyrdom' in the form of 
'suicide bombing ' by Palestinian groups. Fadlullah' s declaration of support over the 
174 The first attack was upon the American Embassy in Beirut, in Apri l o f 1983 , kiUing 80 and injuring 142. In October of 
1983 two simul taneous attacks were preformed on the United States Marine headquarters near Beirut, killing 273 and 
i.njuri.ng 81, and the French Multinational Forces, killing 58 and injuring 15 . In November of 1983 an attack on the 
Israeli Defence Force Headquarters i.n Tyre killed a further 88 and injured 69 . Jim Winkates, Suicide Terrorism: 
Precedents and Profiles, http://www.isanet.org/, (cited: 18th August 2006) 
175 Shaul Kimihi , and Shmuel Even,. "Who are Palestinian Suicide Terrorists?", Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies. 
Strategic Assessment 6:2 (September 2003 ), http: //www.tau.ac. il!icss/sa/v6n2p5Kirn.html , (cited: 26 August 2006) 
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similar plights endured at the hands of the West and Israel forged an alliance between 
the two communities against a common 'oppressive' enemy. This opened up the avenue 
of communication, making Shi 'ite works more available to Sunnis and Sunni works 
more available to Shi'ites. Furthermore, Fadlullah's understanding ofuniversaljihad, is 
very similar to Qutb's understanding and was complementary to jihad ideologies already 
resonating in Palestine. Palestinian Sunnis have a strong Muslim Brotherhood 
connection, dating back to 1935. Qutbian ideologies hold a special place in the 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, and many considered Qutb to be the symbol of 
Revolutionary Islam. 176 It is within the universal jihad vision that Fadlullah confines his 
reinterpretation of'active political martyrdom' , this removes the Shi'ite centric 
understanding of' active martyrdom' legitimated by its modelling on Hussein and 
legitimizes it within the context of a more universal revivalist understanding of jihad as 
the sacrificial tool ofthe politically and militarily weak. Without Lebanon, Fadlullah and 
Hezbollah, as the conceptual stepping-stone, Palestinian Sunni groups may not have 
adopted the use of 'suicide bombing' . 
The transmission of Shi 'ite martyrdom ideologies into Sunni thought maybe more 
concrete than traces of complementary ideologies from Iran and Iraq, via Fadlullah in 
Lebanon to Palestine. Fathi a! Shiqai, a founding member of the Palestinian Movement 
ofthe Islamic Jihad, freely acknowledges that they have had to resort reading Shi'ite 
scholars to help understanding their struggle, as Sunni ideologies do not provide a 
sufficient basis for guidance in the struggle against tyranny and oppression. 177 In a 1999 
interview, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, the secretary general of the Palestinian 
Movement of the Islamic Jihad, acknowledges that they have read the thoughts of 
176 Zaid Abu-Amr, "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background" ,Journal of Palestine Studies 22:4 (Summer 1993 ): p.6 
177 Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suic ide and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
LawJouma/27 (December 2003 ): p. 358 
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Ayatollah Khomeini, Muhammad al-Sadr, Ali Shari 'ati and Fadlullah.178 In a later 
interview in 2003 , when asked if the organisation borrowed the idea of ' suicide 
bombing' from Hezbollah, he answers "Of course", detailing how they were the first to 
use such a tactic and how it was inspirational for Islamic Jihad. 179 
The use of 'suicide bombing' has now spread throughout the world , primarily to Sunni 
groups. 'Suicide bombing' is now synonymous with Sunni Islam and not Shi'a. Infact, 
in a strange twist of fate , in Iraq it is the Shi ' ites who suffer almost daily from 'suicide 
bombings ' executed by Sunni militant, a form of martyrdom whose origins are within 
their own jurisprudential tradition. 
4:3 SHOCK VALUE 
'Suicide bombing' , as an amalgamation of ' active political martyrdom' and jihad, has a 
two-fold weapon value, it creates victims, while maintaining the death ofthe martyrs' 
symbolic value. The choosing to die is the symbolic tool against the 'oppressor' , and the 
symbolic value is within the death. 18° For ' suicide bombing' , as a ' terrorist' tactic, it is 
the attacks 'shock value' that provides the vehicle for the symbolic value to be 
communicated. 
'Suicide bombings" origins within ' active political martyrdom' and the method of 
symbolic value of death, can be seen in the motivations of Sunni groups who use this 
form of martyrdom. They are generally motivated by two things, support and power. 
'Suicide bombing' can be understood as a strategy of communication, intended on one 
178 Khali AI-Ayid, "The Movement oflslamic Jihad and the Oslo Process", Journal of Palestine Studies 28 :4 (Summer 
1999), p. 62 
179 Bernard K. Freamon, "Mat1yrdom, Suic ide and the Is lamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," Fordham International 
Law Journa/ 27 (December 2003 ): p. 358 
180 
'Passive martyrdom' and ' combative martyrdom' has a compensatory value of death, rather than a symbolic va lue within 
the death. 
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level to create fear in the victims and, on an other level, to create sympathy and gain 
support both domestically and internationally. The symbolic value of 'suicide bombing' 
is carried through both fear and sympathy. In order to widen the reach of the symbolic 
value, the act of martyrdom needs publicity and something shocking guarantees media 
coverage. Thus, instigate a shocking event like a 'suicide bombing' and the media will 
act as an instant advertising tool for the symbolic value of the attack. 
'Suicide bombing' adopted because of its' symbolic value, not because of its ability to 
kill, however, it does have advantages as a military tactic. 181 'Suicide bombings" 
symbolic value provides a voice for the 'oppressed' and condemns the 'oppressor' via 
the death of the martyr. 182 In respect to the global media, groups may undertake 'suicide 
bombing' because it will bring attention to their plight. On a domestic level, media 
coverage of a new, shocking attack can amplifY the collective feeling of injustice and 
rally support for the cause. 183 At the same time, it can make a model ofthe martyr for 
doing their part, praising them, glorifYing them and turning them into an instant hero . 184 
Without the need to convey the symbolic value of a 'suicide bombing' the ritual 
surrounding 'suicide bomber' as martyrs, i.e., posters, pamphlets, and video wills, would 
not be as necessary. 185 
181 It is tactically flexible and highly cost effective 
182 See page, 59. 
183 This evaluation of the shock value as a vehicle for the symbolic value an extension on my article on the shock value of 
female 'suicide bombing' and how it impacts the strategic calculations of terrorist movements . James Veitch (ed.), 
International Terrorism : New Zealand Perspectives, (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 2005), pp. 69-81 
184 See Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside th e World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. (Robinson: London, 
2004 ), for various examples of the ritual surrounding female 'suicide bombers' in Palestine. 
185 
www.youtube.com, search: suicide bombing has a selection of various 'suicide bomber' video wills, from Palestine to 
Iraq. http: //www .youtube.com/verify age?next url=/watch?v=zPx 1 U gFfpcO (example of propaganda video) Ad ham 
Ahmad Hujy la Abu Janda! Video Will, prepared before his mission on December 7th 2004. Published on Hamas website 
in February 2006. !tamar Marcus, and Barbara Crook, A Self-Portrait of Suicide Terrorists, 
http://www.pmw.org.ii/Latest%20bulletins%20new.htm (cited: 13°1 August 2006) 
Mu'min Rajah Rajah Abu Haft will, prepared before his miss ion on December 7, 2004, published on Hamas website in 
February 2006. http://www.pmw.org.ii/Latest%20bulletins%20new.htm (cited: 13°1 August 2006) 
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However, there is a catch to the symbolic value of 'suicide bombing' as a 'terrorist' 
tactic, because it is articulated via 'shock value'. ' Shock value ' only has a limited 
lifetime. As a certain type of ' suicide bombing ' becomes more and more routine, the 
'shock value' depletes and thus the symbolic value also depletes. There is a constant 
need to renegotiate the symbolic value by amplifying the 'shock value ' and , thus 
maximising the media potential. Both international and domestic media will pick up on 
any added aspect of a 'suicide bombing' , and the symbolic value of the martyrdom will 
capitalise on the sensationalism. After numerous attacks by male 'suicide bombers' in 
Palestine, the first female 'suicide bomber' was suddenly introduced in 2002. The attack 
was reported in newspapers around the world. This martyrdom required the female 
'suicide bomber' to make an individual conscious decision to not only refute the 
traditional role prescribed by the community and Islam, but reject her life as well, 
sacrificing herself for the cause ofthe Palestinian plight. This increased the scope of the 
symbolic value of the death ofthe martyr against the 'oppressor' oflsrael. However, as 
female 'suicide bombers' became more routine, they too lost their 'shock value' and, 
consequently, the loss of media attention, thus in 2004 a young mother undertook a 
'suicide bombing', renegotiating the symbolic value back onto the side of the martyr. 186 
Since the tum of the millennium, Sunni groups around the world have been pushing the 
conventional boundaries of 'suicide bombing' , creating new and highly shocking events, 
in order to renegotiate the symbolic value and draw on new methods of symbolism. The 
best example is perhaps the attacks of 11 111 September 2001 , which not only reached new 
heights in terms of the number of fatalities but also struck at the symbolic heart of 
186 For more information on the details of the logic behind the introduction offemales into Palestinian 'suicide bombing' 
see, James Veitch (ed.), International Terrorism: New Zealand Perspectives, (Wellington: Institute ofPolicy Studies, 
2005), pp. 69-8 1. For specific information about the individual females lives see, Victor, Barbara. Army of Roses: Inside 
the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. (Robinson: London, 2004) 
76 
America, using its own symbolism against it. I would argue that 9/ 11 was not planned 
based on its ability to kill nearly 3000 people, but more so because of its' symbolic 
value. The death toll was never planned to be that high. The death toll rose due to the 
collapse of the towers, which was not in the control of the 'suicide bombers' . The targets 
were chosen because of their potential symbolic value within American and Western 
identity, as the symbols for their economic and military superiority. 
The transformative nature of'suicide bombing' as a tactic, is a testimony to its origins 
within Shi'a 'active political martyrdom'. It is 'suicide bombings' constant need to 
communicate a symbolic value that accounts form the changes in its use as a tactic. 
4:4 CONCLUSION 
Islamic 'suicide bombing' martyr was introduction in Lebanon in 1983 by the Shi 'a 
group Hezbollah. Fadhlullahs' understanding of 'active martyrdom' is based on the pan-
Islamicjihadization ofShari'ati's weapon ofthe weak, transforming ".([you can, kill, 
and if you cannot, die!" into ".([you can, kill, and if you cannot, die while killing!" This 
clearly demonstrates the reinterpretation ofthe Shi'a revivalist concept of martyrdom 
into a revivalist understanding ofjihad, 'active politico-combative martyrdom' . It is the 
successful use of'suicide bombing' as a tactic and the pronouncements ofFadlullah that 
provided the stepping-stone for Sunni Palestinian groups to adopt the 'suicide bombing' 
form of'active martyrdom'. Fadlullah was sympathetic to the Palestinian situation and 
saw their situation as similar to the Shi 'ite struggles in Lebanon. The two communities 
forged an alliance over a common enemy. Fadlullah reinterpreted the revivalist Shi'a 
'active political martyr' into a context of jihad that was similar to the individualistic , 
pan-Islamic jihad ofQutb that was resonating within Palestinian Sunni groups. 
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Palestinian groups looked to Hezbollah for guidance in the struggle against tyranny and 
oppression and borrowed the clause that Hezbollah had borrowed from Revolutionary 
Iran, "If you can, kill, and if you cannot, die!". 'Suicide bombings" origin as a method 
of martyrdom that condemns the 'oppressor' through the tool of symbolic death is 
demonstrated in 'suicide bombings' transformative nature as a tactic. There is a 
continual need to create shock value in order to communicate the symbolic meaning of 
the martyrdom. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
This study has provided a new understanding of the concept of martyrdom in Islam and 
presented a framework for understanding the development of the 'suicide bomber' as a 
form of martyrdom. It has demonstrated that 'suicide bombing' is not a simple 
development of traditional jurisprudential concepts of martyrdom or jihad, for either the 
Shi'a or the Sunni tradition. The introduction of 'suicide bombing' as a form of 
martyrdom is due to the reinterpretation ofShi'a revivalist martyrdom ideologies into 
Sunni revivalistjihad ideologies. It is 'suicide bombings" martyrological origin within a 
Shi 'a concept of 'political martyrdom' that is crucial to understanding the nature of 
'suicide bombings' use as a tactic. 
The examination ofthe concept of martyrdom in early Islam illustrates the complexities 
of the concept and its sensitivity to changes in the political environment. The early 
developments were primarily due to splits within the Islamic community over the issue 
of authority and the development of different jurisprudential traditions. The dissenting 
groups, including the Shi'ites, placed significant importance on the concept of 
martyrdom. The understanding of martyrdom for dissenting groups is intrinsically 
connected with the issues of injustice and oppression and tends to allow for importance 
to be placed on the 'active' concept of martyrdom. The Sunni traditions development of 
the concept of martyrdom reflects their position as the central authority. The 
development of a 'passive' approach to martyrdom illustrates an attempt to dissociate 
and create jurisprudential distance fi:om dissenting and minority groups. The relationship 
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between the understanding ofthe concept of martyrdom and the political position is 
reflected in the contemporary development and spread of the 'suicide bomber' martyr. 
The introduction ofthe Islamic 'suicide bomber' as a form of martyrdom is not a simple 
development for either the Sunni or the Shi'ajurisprudential traditions . Both Shi'a and 
Sunni revivalist movements in the Twentieth Century revitalised the concept of 
martyrdom and asserted an individualistic response to their specific situations. The Shi'a 
revivalist understanding of martyrdom allows for a martyr who can choose to die a 
symbolic death but who cannot choose to kill. The Sunni revivalist understanding of 
martyrdom allows for a martyr who can choose to kill, but who cannot choose to die. 187 
The 'suicide bomber' , a martyr who can choose to die, while killing, requires a 
reinterpretation of the Shi'a revivalist concept of martyrdom into a Sunni revivalist 
notion of jihad. It is the parallel ideological shifts on the role of the individual and the 
construction of the 'oppressive' enemy in both the revivalist movements to allow for the 
integration ofthe concepts of martyrdom andjihad. 
The Shi'ite revivalist construction of martyrdom is reflected in Shari'ati's phrase, "If 
you can, kill, and if you cannot, die! " This phrase essentially provides the rationale for 
the 'active political martyrdom' ; when no other conventional alternative is available, 
then sacrifice of the life will further the cause oflslam on its sy mbolic value. The 
complementary Sunni revivalist notion ofjihad is illustrated by Qutb 's pan-Islamic 
aggressive notion ofjihad against the Western 'oppressor' , who keeps the Muslim 
societies in a state ofjahiliyya (ignorance). It is every Muslims' individual 
responsibility to participate in this jihad, they must be willing to sacrifice everything for 
this jihad, including their lives. 
187 Note that is a possible martyr, as the construction is ' passive'. 
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The introduction of the Islamic 'suicide bomber' in Lebanon in 1983 demonstrates the 
reality of the reinterpretation of the revivalist Shi'a martyrdom into revivalist Sunni 
jihad. The 'suicide bomber' is essentially a rejihadization ofShari'ati's weapon ofthe 
weak philosophy, transforming "If you can, kill, and if you cannot, die!" into "If you 
can, kill, and ifyou cannot, die while killing!"Thejihadization ofShari'ati's martyrdom 
creates a two-fold weapon, one that allows for enemy causalities, while allowing the 
martyrs' death to maintain its symbolic value against the 'oppressor'. 
The successful use of'suicide bombing' as the tactic by Hezbollah, and Fadlullah's pan-
Islamic approach to jihad against the common 'oppressive' enemy, provided the 
stepping-stone for Sunni Palestinian groups to adopt the 'suicide bombing' form of 
'active martyrdom'. 'Suicide bombings' in Islam is now almost exclusively associated 
with Sunni groups. This demonstrates an increase in the shift from an understanding of 
martyrdom related to authority, to the understanding of martyrdom that is characteristic 
of the oppressed. 'Suicide bombings" transformative nature as a tactic is an attempt to 
create 'shock value', the vehicle through which the symbolic voice ofthe 'oppressed' is 
heard. The current adaptations occurring in 'suicide bombing' use as a tactic are a 
testimony to 'suicide bombings" martyrological origins within a dissenting 
jurisprudential tradition, and an interesting reflection of the current political situations. 
With a primary focus on the concept of martyrdom in Islam, this study is important because it 
sheds a new light on the origins of the Islamic 'suicide bomber'. The development of the 
concept of martyrdom plays a crucial role in defming the conditions for the appropriation of 
'suicide bombing' by Islamic groups and it is the driving forces behind changes in the use of 
'suicide bombings' as a tactic. 
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